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“Hesitating and waiting creates a cost in terms of growth and jobs. We should avoid this. The proposed 
implementation calendar of the 5-presidents report – as a follow-up to my 4-presidents report – shows 
no urgency and is, I fear, not being taken seriously enough. We have to take urgent steps towards a 
Capital Markets Union, a commitment to structural reforms by all member states and later on, a real fiscal 
capacity. On top of more responsibility and more solidarity, we will also need more shared sovereignty.” 
 
Herman Van Rompuy, 
President European Policy Centre, 
Inauguration Address, 10 September 2015 
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EMU - crisis as a stepping stone to further integration or as a trigger for further fragmentation? 
 
Europe is once again engulfed in crisis. The sheer scale of refugees coming daily is not only a major challenge 
for the transit and destination countries, it is also exposing distrust between member states (and vis-à-vis the 
EU institutions). It has also shown that there is an unwillingness to cooperate and compromise within the EU 
system, in part a collateral damage of the eurocrisis. With a continuing sluggish economy and high 
unemployment, external challenges such as the conflict in Ukraine and internal ones like the referendum on 
EU membership in the UK, the EMU crisis looks less urgent at this point, with an agreement with Greece 
preventing the disastrous consequences of a Grexit, at least for now. 
 
The crisis is not over 
 
Time and time again, this has been the pattern of this crisis. Driven by domestic political considerations, actions 
would only be taken when ‘there is no alternative’, i.e. in the midst of acute crisis. In times of a relative lull, the 
drive towards improved governance always lost urgency. This lack of urgency could clearly be seen in the 
publication of the Five Presidents Report: despite suggesting an unambitious implementation timetable, the 
reception by Eurozone members has been lukewarm at best.  
 
Without further governance reform, the crisis will re-enter a hot phase in the near future, most likely in an even 
more unmanageable form, potentially mixed up with the other crises Europe is facing. This summer’s Greek 
crisis highlighted sharply the tricky political economy of the Eurozone: economic interdependence and 
imbalances requiring simultaneously a need for reform and support, driven at EU level, while the political 
consequences of actions are still domestic. Questions around sovereignty and democratic legitimacy were 
posed but ultimately not answered, in part because in the current governance framework they are 
unanswerable. After all, both the Greek Government and the creditors could refer to the democratic 
legitimisation of their actions coming from the domestic level. 
 
Unless one believes that EMU can be unravelled without significant damage to the economic and political 
substance of the EU, the ultimate answer would be a genuine Economic and Monetary Union, underpinned 
by EU-level democratic legitimacy. But this is far-off for now. The mood is for less Europe, not more Europe 
and a European demos is not apparent. Realistically, while not the ideal answer, ‘ambitious muddling through’ 
is the way forward for now. Making small steps now can rebuild trust and become the seed for further 
governance reform in future, as well as putting the mechanisms in place that will be needed when the next 
crisis hits. 
 
The case of Greece 
 
Clearly, further attention will need to be given to Greece. It is a special case, with the crisis deeper and more 
intractable than in other Eurozone countries, intermixed with a challenging domestic political environment that 
makes implementation of any reform plans doubtful. But this time, Greece will have to deliver. Whatever party 
comes out in front, the new government must implement reforms. The 3rd package of support will be the last 
– domestic politics in the creditor countries will not allow for further such deals. Greece must take this 
opportunity, otherwise the Eurozone will accept Grexit as the lesser evil. 
 
But the rest of the Eurozone can, and should, help Greece to deliver. Structural reforms, especially those that 
are growth-enhancing, can often have negative fiscal consequences in the short term. Change is costly and 
the EU should provide more funding – flexibly and unbureaucratically - to facilitate such reforms.  
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Whatever reforms are implemented, without growth, debt and deficits will become more and more 
unmanageable. While some elements have been implemented, there needs to be further action1; the need for 
a comprehensive ‘New Deal’ remains as strong as it was 4½ years ago. See EPC Commentary A New Deal 
to help save the euro  
 
Beyond Greece: a new governance? 
 
The need for EMU governance reform is broader than the case of Greece. The (quicker) implementation of 
the Four Presidents Report and the Five Presidents Report needs to be at the top of the agenda. EMU must 
improve both its mechanisms to prevent future crises and the capacity to deal with a crisis when it emerges. 
See EPC Policy Brief Pathways to achieve a genuine Fiscal Union 
 
The construction of a fiscal capacity should be made a priority to resolve the absence of a mechanism to 
provide effective ex ante fiscal risk sharing in the Eurozone. The EU should also develop a new framework to 
assess the real returns of growth of public and social investment, which could open the path for more flexibility 
on deficits in future. There is also a need to critically assess how the new governance mechanisms are 
working, including reviewing the Country-specific Recommendations with a stronger focus on a smaller 
number of key priorities for each country. See EPC Discussion Paper Policy recommendations for the new 
European Commission: priorities for stabilising EMU  
 
The political economy of EMU 
 
At the heart of the impasse on the further development of EMU lies a political economy problem: while creditors 
might be willing to provide further support, they fear that reforms are not implemented, resulting in a need for 
ongoing transfers. As a consequence, these countries insist on mechanisms to monitor and enforce reforms. 
For those needing support, the price of giving up sovereignty is often only considered in extremis and the 
temptation to backslide on reforms is ever present, mixed up with the often limited institutional capacity to 
deliver. It is time to look again at possible solutions to this impasse. A fiscal capacity, combined with contractual 
arrangements, could be a way of rewarding progress. This could even be tied to debt relief, with a write-off of 
debt linked to delivery of investment and reform.   
 
There is also a need to depoliticise the more technical aspects of economic governance. Increasingly, the 
Commission is seen as a political actor, which clashes with its role to provide independent assessment and 
enforcement of policies, including in the fiscal policy field. There is a need to re-think what role the Commission 
will take in future governance and whether some new institutional arrangements are needed to ensure that 
member states find it easier to accept EU-level recommendations and decisions. See EPC Discussion Paper 
Can the Eurozone’s economic governance combine political accountability, legitimacy and effectiveness?  
 
What ultimate destination? 
 
Making these changes to EMU governance will not solve all the underlying flaws but it will provide for a more 
robust architecture, which will be better able to weather the next storm when it comes. Rather than blaming 
each other for the lack of progress, at EU level there is a need to work out possible deals that are acceptable 
for all member states. Pragmatic but ambitious muddling through is not the ultimate answer but, for now, it is 
better than the alternatives. 
                                                          
1  Such as the Juncker Investment Plan: see EPC Discussion Paper Growth for Europe – Is the Juncker Plan the answer? 
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A New Deal to help save the euro 
 
Fabian Zuleeg and Janis A. Emmanouilidis 
 
The rescue package for Portugal and the recent electoral success of the populist True Finns party 
shows that the euro crisis is not over. Even if the current support mechanisms stabilise the 
markets, they will not be sufficient in the long term: growing economic divergence between the 
eurozone’s strongest and weakest members will increase the strains on political, economic and 
monetary management of the single currency. 
 
Countries such as Greece and Portugal have low growth forecasts and, lacking sectors with high 
economic potential, their current structural reforms and wage moderation will not close the 
competitiveness gap. In the long run, these countries will be unable to cope with a rapidly rising 
debt burden, especially with limited access to financial markets, high spreads and a rising 
interest rate. Without light at the end of a long and dark tunnel, maintaining the reform 
momentum will become increasingly difficult politically. 
 
Ultimately, growth is prerequisite for a sustainable reduction of debt on Europe’s periphery. 
Conversely, the absence of growth would most likely necessitate support for weaker member 
states unable to service their debt. Even a reduction in the cost of financing (for example, 
through eurobonds) or an orderly restructuring of debt will not suffice if the issue of long-term 
divergence is not addressed effectively. Without growth in the periphery, chances are high that it 
will be possible to maintain the Economic and Monetary Union only with ongoing support, getting 
us close to the ‘transfer union’ feared by many. 
 
What can be done to overcome this Catch-22? 
 
What is needed is a ‘New Deal’ for the euro, based on investment rather than transfers. Among 
its principal measures would be: 
 
First, continuous reforms in the weaker countries to enable productive investment, such as a 
simplification of administrative procedures and labour-market reform. 
 
Second, a separate treatment of productive investment (such as education) in the excessive 
debt procedure, austerity programmes and fiscal consolidation plans. 
 
Third, a re-allocation of the EU budget (especially cohesion funding), including a change in 
eligibility criteria, with less focus on gross domestic product and more on combating the crisis 
and reducing imbalances, as well as a new focus on governance and on spending on core drivers 
of growth, such as education. 
 
Fourth, the establishment of a dedicated investment fund - a new Stability and Growth Fund 
(SGF) aiming specifically to deliver the goals of Europe’s growth strategy, Europe 2020, in 
countries unable to make the necessary investments themselves. Funds from the SGF would not 
be a bail-out but a loan-based investment - not a transfer union but an ‘investment union’. 
 
Finally, increased use of new loan/private-public partnership instruments, including project 
bonds, to increase leverage. This would require some funding from the SGF, the European 
Investment Bank or the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
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A New Deal concentrating on investment would increase the political feasibility of reforms, 
demonstrate solidarity, boost growth and employment in the weaker economies, reduce 
divergence in the eurozone and, in the end, calm markets: even speculators take long-term growth 
potential and the political feasibility of reform into account. 
 
Such an approach should also be more acceptable politically in the stronger economies: investing 
money would give them a real stake in achieving economic growth in the weaker economies. 
Further economic integration, a reinvigorated single market, reduced divergence and growth in 
the periphery using surplus savings from the centre would increase Europe’s economic 
dynamism. It might even prove strategically important: if political and economic transformation 
takes hold in north Africa, southern Europe could become a hub for investment projects along 
the EU’s southern periphery. 
 
Are Europe’s leaders ready for this? Not yet - but it will become increasingly clear that half-way 
houses will not work, politically or economically. 
 
Many might argue that a New Deal for the euro is highly unlikely, but economic necessities are 
powerful drivers: who would have thought two years ago that member states would agree on the 
establishment of a permanent rescue mechanism with an effective lending capacity of 
€500,000,000,000? 
 
 
Fabian Zuleeg is Chief Economist and Janis A. Emmanouilidis is a Senior Policy Analyst at the 
European Policy Centre. 
 
This article was published in European Voice on 5 May 2011. 
 
 
 
Since July 2012, financial-market pressure on the 
euro has eased, thanks to the European Central 
Bank's (ECB) commitment to do, in the words of
President Mario Draghi, “whatever it takes” to save
the single currency. But the euro area is still in a
precarious condition which cannot be resolved, in
ultima ratio, by the ECB's action: the aftermath of the
Cypriot bailout shows that Europe is still facing a
structural crisis. 
While the financial crisis originated in the US through
an excess of deregulation in financial markets, it
acquired a truly European nature in 2010, when 
the survival of the single currency began to be
questioned. Today, the euro area continues to face 
an endogenous crisis (generated by shortcomings in
the design of the euro area) and fuelled by the
macroeconomic imbalances that have emerged since
the establishment of the single currency. These can
only be addressed by structural reform of EU
instruments and institutions. 
Many now contend that some degree of fiscal
integration is necessary to overcome the euro area's
structural problems. To fulfill this role, any form of
fiscal union must accomplish, regardless of its
institutional shape, two basic functions: preventing
the emergence of endogenous asymmetric crises1, and
correcting acute economic and fiscal crises.
To fulfill its 'preventative' function, a genuine fiscal
union must have two kinds of mechanism: a credible
system to coordinate economic policies (particularly
in the field of employment) and fiscal rules to prevent
governments from spending beyond sustainable limits. 
To accomplish its 'corrective' function, there must be
(i) a mechanism to support member states in the
implementation of structural reforms by providing
financial support, (ii) some form of fiscal rules to lend
credibility to government claims of paying back debts,
and (iii) instruments to promote economic growth
where and whenever necessary.
Pathways to achieve a Genuine Fiscal Union
The King Baudouin Foundation and Compagnia di San Paolo are strategic partners of the European Policy Centre
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So far, five building blocks have been created to reinforce
the governance framework: the 'Six Pack', including five
regulations and one directive (designed to strengthen the
Stability and Growth Pact); the Fiscal Compact, a new
treaty aiming to reinforce euro-area budgetary discipline;
the 'Two Pack', two regulations designed to underpin the
Six Pack; the European Stability Mechanism, providing 
a permanent financial rescue mechanism; and initial
pieces of legislation regarding the creation of a banking
union. There is widespread commitment among 
euro-area leaders to progress further, creating – in the
medium term – a so-called 'Genuine Economic and
Monetary Union' (GEMU).
But do these innovations deliver the two essential
functions required for a fiscal union? And if not, what
more needs to be done in the short and medium run? 
Assessment of the preventative function: fiscal rules,
policy coordination and imbalances
European fiscal rules are currently based on the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the Fiscal 
Compact. With the Six Pack, the SGP has become 
stricter and more enforceable – and a new set of 
sanctions and new rules to deliver them have been
introduced.
STATE OF PLAY
However, such fiscal rules might not be credible if 
they deepen economic recession in crisis countries.
Where they work effectively, for example in the US,
pro-cyclical fiscal rules are complemented by counter-
cyclical expenditure flows, aiming to offset some of the
negative effects on individual states' economies. With
the SGP, a similar function could be achieved with a
counter-cyclical 'fiscal capacity' at European level.
Even if the introduction of a fiscal capacity is now
included in some official proposals aiming to further
enhance EMU governance2, its proposed functions, as
well as its likely size, seem to be inadequate to deliver
this counterbalancing function. 
The second innovative instrument introduced with the 
Six Pack is the so-called 'European Semester' (ES): 
a system of enhanced national economic policy
coordination. The ES is built on the Annual Growth
Survey (AGS), a strategic document on economic
policy published by the European Commission at the
beginning of each budgetary year, and on a process of
coordination of national policies based on country-
specific recommendations. The ES is complemented 
by a second package of legislation, the so-called 'Two
Pack'. The Two Pack gives the Commission the power
to deliver recommendations on national budgetary
laws, which must be submitted to the EU executive
according to a common time schedule. 
However, the implementation of reforms at national
level still depends on the willingness of national
governments and their parliaments to carry them out.
This implies that member states, in most cases, pursue
necessary (and often unpopular) reforms only in cases
of extreme financial distress, when no other choice 
is possible. It would be more beneficial to have a
mechanism to induce reforms in member states when
imbalances are detected, before the critical phase of
the crisis.
Ongoing discussions about the so-called 'fiscal
capacity' (or 'solidarity mechanism') are mostly related
to this shortcoming: following the political agreement
of 29 June 2012, some kind of financial support might
be provided to member states implementing
recommendations agreed in the framework of the
European Semester. The Commission announced on 
20 March 2013 that it will propose such a financial
instrument to support agreed reforms in member states.
This development might be positive if the available
resources are sufficient and if the conditionality
attached to the agreed reforms is economically
justified. In this regard, a better democratic legitimacy
mechanism will be needed for the ES, provided that
additional financial resources are made available.
The third innovation introduced by the Six Pack is the
Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure, which aims
to prevent the emergence of serious imbalances within
the euro area and individual member states. Even if the
mechanism provides limited incentives to avoid
excessive imbalances, some of them – for example
excessive intra-euro area current account surpluses or
deficits – are typically a matter of coordination, and
often arise following unilateral reforms enhancing
asymmetrically the competitiveness of one member
state relative to others. Effective ex-ante coordination,
more than ex-post sanctioning, is what matters when
dealing with potential macroeconomic imbalances; 
the excessive imbalance procedure may therefore
complement effective policy coordination across the
EU, but by itself it is insufficient. 
Assessment of the corrective function: the European
Stability Mechanism and the new role of the ECB
While there has been some progress in terms of
preventing future crises, the euro area still lacks a
proper tool to pursue macroeconomic stabilisation in
the event of asymmetric shocks. The only instrument
introduced so far is the European Stability Mechanism
(ESM), which provides finance to member states having
difficulty funding their spending through the financial
markets: provided that they accept the conditionality
attached to ESM support and are ready to give 
up substantial sovereignty on fiscal issues and 
policy design. 
This mechanism has three major shortcomings: first,
the intergovernmental nature of the contributions to its
funding implies that national parliaments could acquire
veto rights on aid disbursements to partner countries,
undermining the credibility of the mechanism, as a
level of uncertainty remains. Second, the limitations
imposed on a country's sovereignty have proven to be
so severe that member states do not ask for help until in
desperate need, wasting the opportunity to deal with
problems when they first emerge. Thus there is a risk
that the ESM, which can intervene only when there is
no other alternative and via adjustment programmes
painful for populations, will be perceived as lacking in
democratic legitimacy in the affected countries. Third,
the size of the fund is limited, raising concerns over its
capability to bail out large countries like Spain or Italy. 
Finally, there is the new role for the ECB. Under Mario
Draghi's leadership, the ECB has already played an
essential role, buying time by calming financial
markets. Now the Bank is becoming the institutional
cornerstone of a European Banking Union. But the
contribution of the Banking Union to euro-area
stability is limited by its current design. The goal of a
banking union is to break the vicious circle between
distressed banking systems and sovereign finances. To
achieve this, banking unions usually have three
elements: supervision powers, resolution powers and a
deposit guarantee. In the European case, however, only
the first two are being discussed. The final element, the
joint deposit guarantee, which would have prevented a
substantial proportion of capital outflows from
PROSPECTS
Addressing the euro area's structural shortcomings:
the way forward
These reforms represent a concrete step towards
creating a sustainable monetary union. In terms of
prevention, significant steps have been taken, but the
euro area still lacks a genuine and enforceable
mechanism of policy coordination, as well as a fiscal
capacity that provides positive incentives for reform
before a crisis spreads and that is able to make counter-
cyclical investments that lend credibility to national
fiscal rules. In terms of correction, the main instrument,
the ESM, is lacking in several respects: there is a lack 
of democratic legitimacy in programme countries, an
excessive dependency on national parliaments'
decisions, and a lack of credibility for troubled
countries, as well as a lack of sufficient firepower to
deal with bigger countries.
Some steps could be taken immediately to address
these problems and boost stability and growth in the
euro area:
Firstly, an agreement must be reached over the role 
of the European Parliament in legitimising the
Commission's recommendations and shaping the AGS.
Secondly, euro countries should fully implement the
third point of the euro-area agreement of 29 June 2012,
creating a mechanism to deliver positive financial
incentives from the ESM to countries respecting the
Country-Specific Recommendations agreed under the
ES process.
Thirdly, the ESM should be reinforced with its own
system of 'own resources' (for example, building on
the Financial Transaction Tax) to ensure that its size 
can be adapted over time to emerging challenges. In
this framework, the European Parliament should
acquire a role in providing a democratic backstop to
EU decisions. 
In the medium term, further action is needed to create
a Genuine Fiscal Union, to address such fundamental
problems as democratic legitimacy, coherence and
accessibility for EU citizens, as well as adding further
elements of strength to prevent a similar crisis from
destabilising Europe again.
A genuine fiscal union should build on the foundations
of fiscal and policy coordination facilities created
during the crisis, reinforcing their democratic legitimacy
and complementing them with additional instruments,
rather than creating a completely different model.
In the medium term, such a Genuine Fiscal Union
could have three main pillars to deliver the
preventative and corrective functions:
A reformed EU budget3 with a degree of fiscal
sovereignty for the EU institutions. This implies three
elements: an own-resource system based on (limited)
tax-raising powers; flexible spending power in areas of
EU competence; and the power to make localised
investments to offset, when required, negative 
pro-cyclical consequences of fiscal rules. Such a
system of own resources would provide a backstop to
issue Union Bonds4, which could leverage the EU's
investment capacity. 
The functions of the EU budget would be threefold:
firstly, it would continue to deal with existing
supranational policies. Secondly, it would deal with
emergency cases, providing financing to member states
in financial difficulty under strict conditionality (with
the funding and functions inherited from the ESM, now
merged into the EU budget). Thirdly, it would provide
an investment vehicle to sustain the real economy of
countries adjusting their fiscal balance. Euro-area
budgetary support should be subject to democratic
scrutiny at EU level through the European Parliament,
with the Commission accountable to Parliament for
discretionary expenditure.
In terms of resources, these operations could be
financed with Union bonds backed by the EU's new
fiscal powers: this would substantially boost the link
with own resources (and therefore legitimacy) while
postponing the financing needs of the adjustment to 
the future, after the rebalancing process, reducing 
the actual financial burden on today's lending
countries. This solution would be attractive both for
lending countries, which would pay less for euro-area
adjustment, and for crisis countries, which would enjoy
financial support for reforms that they had already
committed to implementing.
A Joint Budgetary Procedure: The second pillar would
include the functions of budgetary and policy
coordination managed today under the ES and the 
Two Pack. The Joint Budgetary Procedure would be
negotiated through a reiterative process between
peripheral countries (stabilising banks and reducing 
the need for support) is not on the table at the moment,
depriving the European Banking Union of an essential
facility. The weakness of the Banking Union measures
being discussed at the moment was evident during 
the Cyprus crisis, when a full-fledged banking union
could have prevented capital flight from the country:
thus avoiding the re-introduction of capital controls,
which have distanced the isle from the rest of the
Monetary Union.
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national governments and parliaments and the EU
institutions. Parliaments would retain power over their
part of the spending and would be incentivised to
follow the EU framework by having a guarantee
underpinning at EU level the part of their spending
agreed with their partners. 
This procedure gives all member states a clear
incentive to comply: firstly, effective coordination
would free up resources for use in national 
budgets. Secondly, it would be politically difficult 
for non-cooperating countries to obtain resources 
from the EU budget. Finally, lack of cooperation 
would imply participating in guaranteeing other
countries' debt without enjoying the same protection
– which could meet with political opposition from
national constituencies.
A 'super-commissioner' elected by the European
Parliament would have the power to veto
implementing budgets if they differ from the Joint
Budget Agreement. A joint guarantee from member
states might be available for debt emitted in order 
to achieve the agreed level of expenditure, while no
guarantee would be available for debt emitted to
finance budgets vetoed by the Commission but still
pursued at member-state level.
National budgets: In this proposed model of fiscal
union, member states would autonomously pursue
their own aims and would finance their sovereign
budgets independently for any kind of expenditure
that is not a source of systemic risk. No joint
guarantee on debt emission would apply for this
national expenditure. The only constraint would 
be the SGP, applied to the national budget in its
totality. Surpluses or balanced budgets under the
second pillar would free up resources for 
non-systemic expenditure, creating a sustainable
dynamic; deficits under the second pillar would not
create systemic risks but would impose restrictions on
national budgets.
In the event of heavy financial distress at national
level, the EU budget and the ESM might provide,
under strict conditionality, temporary financial
support for sovereign budgets.
The threefold model of fiscal union has its advantages: 
it addresses the shortcomings of the euro area's
design, prevents long-term mutualisation of historical
debt stocks (a politically and economically tricky
issue), and creates strong policy coordination in many
sectors where EU added value could be the
foundation of a European renaissance.  
There are, of course, other models of how to complete
fiscal union; most of them, however, fail to take 
into account both the needs and interests of surplus
and deficit countries. They lack the element of 'great
bargaining' that would ensure the compliance 
of all member states. Whatever route is chosen, 
the creation of a genuine fiscal union must be a
political priority for euro-area countries. Any delay 
or eventual failure to proceed with fiscal integration
would leave the shortcomings of EMU unaddressed,
leading to the reemergence of the crisis once 
the effect of the ECB's monetary interventions
inevitably wanes.
Francesco Nicoli is a Programme Assistant at the
European Policy Centre.
This paper was written in the framework of the
European Policy Centre's programme on Europe's
Political Economy.
1. An asymmetric crisis occurs when two countries are hit by the same phenomenon in opposite ways: for example, falling
GDP in the first country and increasing GDP in the second country at the same time. Such crises are particularly dangerous for
monetary unions, because neither monetary policy nor exchange rates can act as tools for adjustment.
2. The 'four presidents' report and the European Commission's 'Blueprint'.
3. In the long run, all member states except the UK and Denmark are committed to participating in the Monetary Union.
However, it is unclear whether all of these countries will indeed join the euro area. If they do not, the creation of a single
Union Budget might be problematic, and specific solutions for the euro area would be needed.
4. Union bonds, in contrast to Eurobonds, are not a form of mutualisation of historical national debt: they represent an
instrument to pursue new forward-looking joint expenditure.
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Executive Summary
The euro area crisis exposed substantial structural flaws in the currency area's architecture. Improvements in the
euro zone's economic governance, the introduction of a (limited) banking union, the European Central Bank’s
(ECB) unconventional support, and, consequently, the substantially reduced fear of a country exiting the common
currency have all contributed to overcoming the immediate risk of the euro area's collapse. But a number of
fundamental issues still need to be addressed.
In the short term, an appropriate balance within the new governance system between sustainable public finance
consolidation and Member States' public/social investment needs has to be found, but such flexibility should not
lead to a repatriation of fiscal powers to the national level. The new European Commission should develop a new
framework to assess the real returns to growth of public and social investment, which could open the path for
more flexibility on deficits in future.
In close coordination with the European Parliament (EP), the Commission should also review the way the Country
Specific Recommendations (CSRs) are drawn up. The CSRs specifically need a stronger focus on a smaller number
of key priorities for each country, clearly focused on growth and going beyond mere expenditure cuts. There is
also a need to foster political commitment by all of the Eurogroup to adhere to the new governance and to
politically support it in public.
The absence of mechanisms to provide effective ex ante fiscal risk sharing in the euro zone needs to be addressed.
This could be done through the establishment of a fiscal capacity. Euro area governments and EU institutions
(including the EP) should intensify their efforts to set out the conditions, roadmap and outline features of such a
fiscal capacity in the very near future. The Commission should make the construction of a fiscal capacity a priority
in the new political cycle.
In addition to institutional/governance issues, the attention now needs to be directed even more strongly towards
encouraging growth and thus, ultimately, jobs. To boost growth, there is a need to encourage private, public and
 
Introduction and context
The EU, and in particular the euro zone, has been in the grip of crisis for more than five years. While other
industrial countries outside Europe also suffered from the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2007, the
consequences, such as the evolution into a sovereign debt crisis, were nowhere felt as severely as in the euro
area. To make matters worse, the EU was/is facing not just one but a number of highly complex, multi-rooted and
highly interlinked crises: a banking crisis, a public and private debt crisis, a competitiveness crisis, an institutional
crisis, a growth and investment crisis, a social/unemployment crisis, and, last but not least, a political crisis
characterised by high levels of political instability and the rise of populist anti-establishment/elitist, anti-EU/euro
and anti-immigration parties and movements.
Together all these crises have produced a crisis of confidence, undermining the trust of markets, citizens, elites,
and global partners in the future of the euro and of the EU itself. The individual and collective experience of recent
years has thus revealed and exacerbated significant deficiencies in the EU's, and especially EMU's, economic
and political construction, as well as highlighting consequences of past decisions, such as a lack of fundamental
structural reforms in Southern Europe or the breach of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) by Germany and
France in 2003.
Origins of the crisis
At the inception of the EMU it was acknowledged that structural differences between Member States
existed, but it was widely assumed that a currency union would lead to business cycle symmetry, which
would also create synchronicity when economic shocks hit, which could then be dealt mainly through
centralised monetary policy (IMF 2013). While some predicted the exact opposite, i.e. the divergence of
economic cycles1, others such as Frankel & Rose (1998) argued in an influential paper that the participation
in the monetary union itself would drive convergence.
In reality, large country-specific shocks persisted within the euro zone. Consequently, two years after the
collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2007, Europe became the epicentre of the biggest financial and economic
crisis since the Great Depression in the 1930s. What began as a government debt crisis in some of the
smallest economies on its periphery soon exposed the fundamental deficits of a fully-fledged 
monetary union without an equally strong economic and political dimension, making it clear that the euro
area was in need of, at the very least, more effective fiscal policy coordination. When the Greek crisis
escalated in early 2010, many European leaders insisted the country's problems were unique, but 
the markets disagreed. The crisis quickly spread to other EU countries and it became obvious that the Union
– and especially the euro area – was insufficiently equipped to weather the storm; EMU lacked the
necessary institutional structures, procedures, rules and instruments to prevent such a crisis from beginning,
spreading and deepening.
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social investment, at EU and at Member State level. The crucial step needed now is an ambitious European
Investment Programme (EIP). The Commission should expedite the creation of such a Programme and ensure that
the implementation of a EIP is compatible with the long term goals of a fiscal capacity, and that the possibility for
a consolidation of the two measures in the future is given.
In the medium term, these actions are necessary but not sufficient. There continues to be a need to systemically
address the flaws and gaps in the current governance framework, including the questionable effectiveness of EU
policy in influencing national policies, the need to further deepen the banking union, a need to strengthen the
social dimension of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the creation of a fully-fledged fiscal union,
including addressing the incomplete political legitimacy and accountability framework, and creating a better
framework for the limited mutualisation of some public debt. 
 
New governance
In response, the EU has introduced a wide range of new governance instruments, entailing a much greater
degree of intervention, especially in relation to fiscal policy and the financial sector (banking union). With
the absence of an effective ex ante economic governance, the current crisis had to deal with a newly
created ex post rescue mechanisms: the temporary and permanent euro zone firewalls EFSF (European
Financial Stability Facility) and ESM (European Stability Mechanism), which have provided the currency
area with a powerful tool to combat immediate crisis and to also deal with future substantive economic
shocks, which could put sovereigns under fiscal stress. In addition, the ECB's readiness to do 'whatever it
takes' has stopped the spiral of uncertainty and speculation, which led to unsustainable public debt
financing costs, particularly in Southern Europe (Emmanouilidis 2013).
Since this mechanism of ex post rescue is costly in terms of output and employment, the so-called 'Six-Pack',
'Two-Pack' and 'Fiscal Compact' have also been introduced to substantially improve ex ante fiscal
governance. The 'Six-Pack', which is applicable to all Member States, introduced the Macroeconomic
Imbalance Procedure (MIP) and reinforced the preventive and corrective arm of the SGP. The 'Two-Pack' is
directed towards strengthening the euro area's surveillance mechanisms. It improved the monitoring and
assessment of the euro area and introduced special provisions for those countries in difficulties regarding
their financial stability and those in receipt of financial assistance.2 Furthermore, the Fiscal Compact, which
refers to the fiscal part of the intergovernmental Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG),
complements the Six-Pack in a more stringent way with regards to the SGP. The new 'Reverse Qualified
Majority Voting' (RQMV) for the corrective arm of the SGP and the MIP, which was introduced with the 
Six-Pack, reflects a new form of automaticity (Thillaye et al. 2014).
The construction of a banking union, despite the non-inclusion of sufficient financial backstops, was the
most prominent reform to EMU governance. Prioritising the banking union over other euro-area-level
reforms was important: through cross-border portfolio diversification and borrowing and saving, capital and
credit markets can play an even more important role than national fiscal policy for the stabilisation of the
business cycle (IMF 2013). Furthermore, overcoming uncertainties in the financial sector is important for
the euro's stability and particularly for the recovery of crisis-hit countries, and thus to halt and reverse
economic fragmentation within the EU and euro area. Without this, peripheral countries could find
themselves trapped in a permanent cycle of low investments, high capital costs, savings flight, wage
deflation, low growth and persistently high unemployment, with a negative impact not only on these
countries but also for the growth perspectives of the EU and euro area as a whole.
Further progress needed
While the situation remains volatile, at the time of writing (September 2014), fears of the worst-case
scenario of a euro meltdown have receded. A number of fundamental issues still need to be addressed to
prevent a reoccurrence of acute crisis in future. In the short term, there is a need to find an appropriate
balance within the new governance system between sustainable public finance consolidation and
public/social investments (flexibility), as well as ensuring that the new governance mechanisms work as
effectively as possible in encouraging sustainable economic and fiscal policies at Member State level.
There now is a need to shift focus from enforcing fiscal discipline, which was necessary in order to tackle
the immediate risks stemming from the sovereign debt crisis, to creating mechanisms to provide effective
ex ante fiscal risk sharing in the euro zone through the creation of a fiscal capacity. In addition to
institutional/governance issues, the attention needs to be directed even more strongly towards encouraging
growth and thus, ultimately, jobs through an EIP. Although most levers to drive long term growth and
employment lie at Member State level, EU policies can create a facilitating environment, as, for example,
set out in the Europe 2020 strategy, where the mid-term review might provide a chance to closer align the
strategy to current economic challenges.
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In the medium term, it will become necessary to correct the existing flaws and gaps in the current governance
framework, including enhancing EU implementation/enforcement powers. Further automaticity is essential
in order to credibly prevent the build-up of future crises: if political decisions at Member State level are
needed to precede any support action, it forecloses necessary ex ante prevention. The available instruments,
both old and new ones, are also too complex and therefore difficult to understand for policy-makers that
need to quickly apply and comply with the rules. This complexity is thus a further factor that leads to low
automaticity, potentially obstructing the necessary degree of ex ante support for the prevention of new crises.
In the longer term, there is also need to further deepen the banking union (including especially the
establishment of bigger common fiscal backstops), a need to strengthen the social dimension of EMU (see,
for example, Andor 2013) and the creation of a fully-fledged fiscal union, including addressing the
incomplete political legitimacy and accountability framework and integrating the governance instruments
outside the EU system into the existing EU mechanisms, as well as creating a better framework for the
mutualisation of (at least some) public debt. In addition, Europe will need to address the debt overhang
(public as well as private) that persists in a number of countries. Expansionary monetary policy will also be
needed to counteract the threat of (continuous) deflation in a number of countries.
The new economic governance at EU level, especially at euro zone level – and its likely further
development in the coming years – also raises a number of broader political issues. Can an effective way
be found which combines common responsibility for some debt while avoiding additional moral hazard?
How best to improve the incomplete legitimacy/accountability mechanisms? How much sovereignty are
euro zone countries willing to pool in return for a more stable system, which includes assistance for those
under pressure? How will this affect the overall EU integration process, with deeper differences in
integration between euro zone and non-euro zone?
Coordination within and between the EU Institutions
At this point in time, there is clearly a need to make the existing economic governance instruments,
including the European Semester work as effectively as possible (within its limitations which will be
discussed later in this paper). This will also require effective coordination within the Commission. The new
structure of the Commission aims to enforce Commissioners breaking out of their policy silos through the
new coordination role of the Vice-Presidents (VPs). There is also a closer link to the challenges the EU faces
by giving each Vice-President (VP) broad policy objectives as their area of responsibility.
But this new structure carries risk. The new structure is a flexible matrix, with groups of Commissioners
working together on a case-by-case basis which can raise questions over clear lines of reporting, not only
for Commissioners but also for the Commission services. A structure with designated clusters under each
VP would have been clearer.3 There are overlaps between the different portfolios and it is not clear how
coordination will look in practice. This matters especially for the governance of EMU. There are at least
three Commissioner-designates closely linked to this, namely VP Valdis Dombrovskis (Euro and Social
Dialogue), VP Jyrki Katainen (Jobs, Growth, Investment and Competitiveness) and Pierre Moscovici
(Economic and Financial Affairs, Taxation and Customs). 
Their mission letters4 trigger a number of questions: What exactly is the difference between steering and
driving the European semester process? How (and led by whom?) will structural reforms be delivered and
incentivised? What happens if there is a potential trade-off between growth and fiscal discipline? Who (and
with what supporting bureaucracy) will develop the proposals for action on areas such as the fiscal capacity
if a VP and a Commissioner both have this task? What happens if there is a dispute over whether certain
areas fall within the remit of a VP, for example, what elements of regulating the financial sector should be
considered part of EMU governance? At the very least, there will have to be more clarity at the outset of
how exactly this new structure is envisioned to work in practice.
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It also needs to be recognised that, in particular for the development of new proposals and initiatives, a link
to the Member States is essential. With the Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs, Taxation and
Customs representing the Commission at the Eurogroup meetings, it is difficult to see how the VPs can exert
direct influence. This could become an even greater issue if the Eurogroup tasks the Commissioner for
Economic and Financial Affairs, Taxation and Customs with particular actions. In practice, would the VPs
overrule such direction from the Member States? 
Regarding deficit targets, in cooperation with the (European) Council, the Commission also needs to find
an agreed way forward regarding flexibility/adherence, including how public/social investment should be
treated and who, has the decision making power on this matter. The question of who should be the lead
Commissioner to develop and implement a proposal on this follows the questions raised above, concerning
the effectiveness of the new structure.
As far as the medium and long term is concerned, a crucial but missing euro zone ex ante crisis prevention
instrument is a fiscal capacity. The European Commission should make the creation of such an instrument a
priority in the new political cycle, while coordinating its efforts closely with the EP and the next President of
the European Council. Independent of its concrete design, EU institutions and participating Member States
need to underline the democratic legitimacy of the novel instrument by making sure that the EP will be
responsible for scrutinising the operation of any kind of a new fiscal capacity.
Furthermore, as a fiscal capacity would first and foremost affect the euro zone, the Eurogroup would need
to be granted a more significant role. This could for instance be accounted for if a full-time Eurogroup
President was to be established. Taking into account the multiple challenges ahead and the heavy workload
of finance ministers it makes sense to create such permanency, providing the capacity to devote the
Eurogroup president's full attention to the tasks associated with the post and to take a more pro-active role
on the governance development of the euro zone.
In addition, there is a need to encourage private, public and social investment to boost growth. This is a
considerable challenge in the current environment but there are a number of possible ways of boosting
investment and thus, in the longer term, sustainable growth. The crucial step needed now is a EIP, which in
particular provides support to SMEs in crisis countries to overcome the limited access to finance. The European
Commission should draw up such a programme and ensure its support by the Member States, as well as
monitoring the necessary Member State actions. The priorities of the EIP should then be reflected in the Annual
Growth Survey, to be translated into CSRs.
Finally, to promote institutional coherence and reduce the complexity of the enhanced system of economic
governance, the European Commission should (continue to) actively support the gradual integration of EMU
structures created outside the Union's framework into the EU Treaties. The many intergovernmental
agreements and arrangements of recent years should, at some not too distant future, be integrated into the
Union's treaty framework. To prepare the grounds for an amendment of the Union's primary law, a group
of 'wise (wo)men' could in the first half of the new political cycle prepare a report on the areas where the
EU Treaties will need to be reformed in the course of the next decade in light of the manifold economic,
financial, political and global challenges. The EP should be closely involved in the process of preparing the
EU for treaty change.
The new governance in practice
The European semester and the implementation of Country-Specific Recommendations
While the euro zone has introduced many new governance instruments aimed particularly at fiscal discipline,
which seemed impossible some years ago, the success or failure of the reformed EMU will depend on whether
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it can reduce critical imbalances within the euro zone. This includes a clear need for those countries which
have fallen behind in terms of competitiveness to catch up by continuing to carry out structural reforms.
However, the EU still lacks effective ways to promote and support reforms in individual euro zone countries.
The main instrument, the European Semester process with the associated CSRs, is not functioning as originally
envisaged. The main potential of the European Semester exercise is that it reveals structural macroeconomic
weaknesses in Member States and so can help to trigger or foster debate about what needs to be done at
national level. However, despite all the time and energy invested at both the national and European level, in
most cases, the recommendations attract little attention.
Even when the more controversial recommendations are discussed at Member State level, they are rarely
implemented outside programme countries: recent experience has shown that the implementation of national
reform programmes in line with the CSRs is at best partial across the EU.5 Member States are all too often
reluctant to risk a domestic political backlash by translating recommendations, which they have agreed to at
European level, into practice, especially if these concern painful reforms which affect key parts of the electorate,
for example, pensions or public services. Consequently, a number of governments have publicly criticised
'Brussels' for telling them what to do rather than implementing the agreed reforms. In the end, the system lacks
effective implementation mechanisms: Member States ultimately cannot be politically forced to implement
reforms against their will unless they are subject to strict adjustment programmes supervised by the Troika.
There is also criticism that often the recommendations are primarily driven by the need for expenditure cuts
to achieve fiscal consolidation, rather than being future growth oriented. Specifically, there is a concern that
public and social investments are not considered sufficiently and that the idea of 'invest-to-save' to improve
the long-term efficiency and effectiveness of public services does not feature. This is often coupled with the,
partially justified, criticism that the recommendations reflect a 'Christmas tree' approach, i.e. that every part
of the Commission adds their particular areas of concern, with no real prioritisation and that there is no real
assessment of the ability/capacity of countries to deliver these reforms.
Together with the EP and in close coordination with the Eurogroup/Council, the Commission should review
the way the recommendations are drawn up, specifically focusing the process on a smaller number of key
priorities for each country, with strong attention on future growth. There is then a need to systematically
monitor the implementation of the CSRs and to initiate discussion within the Eurogroup if key
recommendations are not implemented, regardless of the country involved, also pointing out the implications
of non-compliance for the governance of the euro zone as a whole. In addition, more innovative ways must
be found to encourage the implementation of recommendations agreed at EU level. In other words, there is
a need to provide incentives for reform to ensure decisive implementation of adjustment measures at the
Member State level (IMF 2013, p. 18). One way to incentivise structural reforms is through contractual
arrangements linked to a fiscal capacity, discussed later in this paper.
In the end, these actions can counteract some of the shortcomings of the current governance system but it
will not be the full answer. The governance at EU level still lacks an effective way of ensuring the
implementation of CSRs at Member State level but this will require a more systemic governance reform.
Budgetary flexibility
A particular area of focus for the new governance has been fiscal policy, especially within the euro zone,
including budgetary surveillance, with governments having to regularly submit their budgets for
Commission scrutiny and the Commission being able to demand revised plans if there is non-compliance
with the SGP. This complements the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP), which applies to countries
exceeding the thresholds of 3% of deficit to GDP and 60% of debt to GDP not diminishing at a satisfactory
pace. This increased power over Member States' fiscal policies has been controversial, as reflected in the
debate in recent years about the potential trade-off between austerity and growth, and what implication this
should have for deficit/debt targets.
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While in many ways this is a false dichotomy, there nevertheless has been a growing recognition that too strong
fiscal austerity does not deliver the desired results in countries in acute distress; this was reinforced by the
recognition of the IMF in end-2012 that the fiscal multipliers (i.e. the negative impact of public expenditure
cuts on growth) were higher than previously thought. This has led to many, especially from Southern Europe,
suggesting that national reforms could be incentivised through a higher degree of flexibility regarding the
implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact and the rules enshrined in the 'Six-Pack' and 'Two-Pack',
while still respecting the spirit of the Pact and the need to maintain a course towards fiscal consolidation. They
further contend that the rules should be relaxed to ensure that excessive public spending cuts do not end up
triggering a downward spiral by negatively affecting growth which in turn reduces revenue and worsens
deficits, requiring further austerity. This argument is made especially strongly with regard to public investments.
However, for countries in public finance distress outside the direct support mechanism of the euro zone,
market mechanisms will, at least in part, impose a certain level of fiscal discipline through higher borrowing
costs. Flexibility thus needs to be accompanied by a credible, medium-term strategy: "Flexibility in the fiscal
rules will only be credible if fiscal policy is anchored in medium-term fiscal plans that clearly state the path
back to lower debt levels. In particular, any accommodation for the cycle during downturns needs to be
accompanied with plans to offset this over the medium term, possibly in an automatic way. While such
corrective mechanisms have in principle been agreed in the Fiscal Compact, they still have to be designed
at the national level, and made consistent across countries." (IMF 2013, p. 17)
It is also not clear what exactly is meant by flexibility. In effect, the current provisions already incorporate
a considerable degree of flexibility – countries can be given a longer time frame to return to the deficit
ceiling under the EDP if there are good reasons for this longer convergence path. The debate around
flexibility might thus not (only) be about a specific application of the rules but rather about who makes the
assessment and decisions, i.e. that this is done at EU level, rather than being an autonomous decision left
to the Member State itself as in the pre-crisis period. Thus, for some countries, it seems that the main
objection is to the imposition of rules by the European level, rather than the content of the rules itself or
how flexibly they are applied. This is in essence an argument about the repatriation of fiscal governance,
away from the European level and back to the Member State level. Moving in this direction would
undermine effective fiscal coordination at the euro zone level, in part restoring one of the flaws which were
at the origin of the 'euro crisis'. It would also undermine the underlying political bargain of solidarity within
the euro zone: support only with conditionality to achieve greater fiscal consolidation and structural reform.
There are also good arguments for a more flexible interpretation of the rules if money is invested rather than
consumed. While total public deficit matters, the quality of public spending is probably more significant. If
spending enhances long-term growth, for example, through public infrastructure or social investment in
areas such as innovation, skills and education, it is important that this kind of investment is maintained,
even in times of fiscal constraints. It is also vital to recognise that public funding is crucial to carry out long-
term sustainable structural reforms which go beyond simple expenditure cuts (e.g. invest-to-save in
digitalisation, preventative spending on health, labour market activation policies) where again fiscal
constraints should not stop public spending.
To classify spending as public or social investment, the crucial issue is one of return – this kind of spending
needs to produce the desired outcomes effectively. To be able to take this investment into account consistently,
the EU would have to develop a framework on how spending can be assessed for its long-term growth effects,
i.e. how far it constitutes public or social investment rather than public consumption and whether it effectively
enhances growth potential; a process which needs to be initiated by the Commission and supported by the EP.
Even if such assessment framework can be developed, it does not address the underlying issue of fiscal space:
public finances remain constrained in many countries, with a continuing need for fiscal consolidation. There
is thus a need for a limited degree of debt mutualisation, as well as direct support. The fiscal capacity, which
has been discussed for the euro zone, might be a mechanism that can provide cross-border support for this
kind of spending.
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8Limitations of rules-based governance
The debate around flexibility also shows some of the limitations of a 'rules-based' approach. It is difficult
to pick appropriate rules/targets in the first place, especially if the environment is changing rapidly (e.g. is
the 3% deficit limit appropriate for all countries in all economic circumstances, pre- and post-crisis?). It is
also difficult to determine whether a country's failure to meet a target is down to willingness or incapacity
to deliver. In addition, in times of crisis, rules sometimes need to be treated more flexibly. This raises the
questions of under what circumstances there needs be a more flexible interpretation of the rules and who
decides, i.e. whether this is decided at European level.
A perennial challenge in a rules-based system is how to ensure compliance and what enforcement
mechanisms are available. As demonstrated by the impact of France and Germany breaching the SGP in
2003, it is especially important that all countries are seen to comply with the rules, including the larger,
more powerful ones, to safeguard the long-term credibility of such a governance system. Here, the reactions
in Germany regarding the investigations of its export surplus under the MIP (fully in line with the
governance instruments that have just been created) are concerning. The Commission's start of an in-depth
review of Germany's account surplus (which the Commission was required to carry out as the surplus was
above the 6% threshold) raised objections from across the political spectrum, alleging that the EU was trying
to reduce the competitiveness of German industry. This controversy leaves, at the very least, some doubts
whether bigger and more powerful countries feel that the rules apply to them equally.
Fiscal capacity
While the improvements in economic governance will be helpful to support fiscal-policy coordination and
prevent the accumulation of macroeconomic imbalances, in the absence of individual exchange rates, internal
adjustment mechanisms need to offset negative economic shocks in a currency union. In the literature on
Optimal Currency Areas (OCAs), which builds on Mundell's (1961) Nobel Prize winning work, two main
necessary criteria for OCAs' functioning are identified: factor mobility, in particular labour, and prices and
wages flexibility. Labour mobility has been traditionally low in the euro area, which, in comparison to other
currency areas such as the U.S., can be partially explained by language and cultural barriers. Other factors,
that prevent higher unemployment to be absorbed through intra-EU mobility, are persistent institutional
barriers between euro area members, i.e. for instance the missing cross-border portability of pensions and
unemployment benefits (IMF 2013, p. 9). In addition, prices and wages in the euro area exhibit large
downward rigidities making timely real exchange rate adjustments difficult (Jaumotte & Morsy 2012); and real
wage adjustments are socially and politically costly. Due to the weak fulfilment of these basic pre-conditions
in the euro zone, other factors are needed to compensate and should therefore be strengthened to make the
currency union functional, such as trade integration and fiscal integration.6
In addition, the current architecture of the euro area only allows for an insufficient response to large country-
specific shocks, because some euro area members are currently not in the position to give sufficient fiscal
responses and centralised monetary policy cannot, by definition, counteract the occurrence of localised
shocks. The crisis has shown that, when country-specific shocks are large and national fiscal buffers are low,
Member States cannot deliver stabilisation policy alone. There is thus a need for some form of centralised
fiscal policy in order to future-proof the euro area. The introduction of a 'fiscal capacity', especially for
countries in the euro area, could be a means to enhance intra-area risk sharing, which could provide ex ante
support to euro countries before crises can fully materialise (Wolff 2012). While smaller shocks should
continue to be dealt with at national level, a fiscal capacity could provide relief against insufficient national
fiscal policy when larger shocks occur. Furthermore, the fiscal capacity could also provide stabilisation policy
in case of area-wide shocks. A centralised fiscal capacity could guarantee, if equipped with adequate
resources, a better provision of countercyclical responses to such shocks to prevent the under-provision of
fiscal stimulus caused by 'free riding' behaviour which leads to a suboptimal fiscal policy mix.
 
9A requirement for generating the necessary political support for the fiscal capacity in the foreseeable future
would be a strong commitment to longer term distributional neutrality, i.e. the avoidance of permanent transfers.
Without such a norm, political backing from surplus countries will be unlikely. In practice, the long term
distributional neutrality can, however, be impossible to achieve because even if the capacity would only aim at
covering temporary shocks, permanent shocks may be difficult to distinguish when they occur. Furthermore,
smaller countries would probably draw on the capacity more often, as they may be more exposed to
idiosyncratic shocks and would therefore receive more than they would contribute over the long term. However,
the euro area's centralised monetary policy is more influenced by larger countries' inflation developments and
therefore centralised fiscal policy could be a good counterbalance to this large country bias. (IMF 2013, p. 26)
Fiscal capacity instruments
In theory, the best way to distribute spending as well as revenue shares of such a fiscal capacity would be to
tie payments to a measure of the business cycle. This could be achieved through the use of real time output
gaps. Large negative (positive) output gaps would thus imply large received (paid) contributions from the
capacity. In practice, however, the forecasting methods necessary for estimating output gaps in real time are
controversial and the differences between estimates and historically revised output gaps are large.7 Other forms
of automatic stabilising could be achieved through the linking of support to sovereign bond spread deviations
from a pre-defined threshold. While this would be an effective method to support sovereigns that are threatened
to be priced out of the market when large shocks occur, such a mechanism would most likely lead to permanent
transfers (Wolff 2012, p. 10).
The fiscal capacity could also be tied to labour market performance and be organised as an automatic stabiliser,
for example, the provision of an area-wide insurance scheme against short-term (cyclical) unemployment.8
However, this type of support might not achieve the required level of crisis prevention, as unemployment
insurances are considered to have a negligible macroeconomic effect on regional shocks and are therefore
weak shock absorbers (Asdrubali et al. 1996, cited in Wolff 2012, p. 8). This is related to the fact that
unemployment lags GDP contraction, which raises the question of how timely such insurance can provide relief
against economic shocks. Moreover, such an insurance could only be made possible if a completed Single
Labour Market would allow for labour taxation and potentially pension rights to exhibit a certain degree of
harmonisation (IMF 2013, p. 20). In addition, there are real questions about the necessary scale which would
need to be achieved to effectively carry out this function.
Even without setting up automatic stabilisers, unemployment could also be used as a targeting criterion for
discretionary spending, but this could even increase the timing issue, which is already apparent if such
spending was designed as an automatic stabiliser. It would also be necessary to exclude any targeting on
structural unemployment since this could lead to permanent transfers due to large area-wide differences.
Politically, this could raise the spectre of a 'transfer union', which is not acceptable in the countries which
would now need to provide the bulk of the funding.
When deciding on the actual policies supported, many have advocated that a fiscal capacity should focus its
spending on labour market policies and on public/social investments that are beneficial for creating long-term
growth, such as infrastructure or education. A centralised capacity could also span some form of social security
net that would ensure the minimum provision of government services and social security in case of major 
crises. Spending could either be carried out directly at euro zone level, for instance for infrastructure projects,
or be delegated to the national level, which would however require some form of central oversight and
enforcement power.
The latter could be addressed through the conclusion of 'contractual arrangements' between the respective
country, as set out i.a. in the Commission's (2013) proposal for a Convergence and Competitiveness Instrument
(CCI). However, such contractual arrangements could be unpopular with recipients if seen as a way of exerting
central/EU control, especially in case the incentives provided through a new fiscal capacity are not significant
enough. Contractual arrangements between individual Member States and the EU/Commission also need to be
designed carefully to make the projects implementable in practice, otherwise the process could become slow,
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cumbersome and bureaucratic, with too many small projects, and there might be difficulties of finding
sufficient eligible projects, providing real structural reforms rather than mere cutting of expenditure, as well
as monitoring their delivery. Many of these problems are mirrored in the EU's structural and investment
funds; it is necessary to prevent the fiscal capacity from essentially becoming a copy of the regional funds
for the national level.
While there are many problems and uncertainties which need to be addressed, the creation of some form
of centrally coordinated fiscal policy is necessary and should be introduced in the immediate future. Over
time, the fiscal capacity could be further extended and refined, learning from the initial implementation
period, i.e. the introduction of a fiscal capacity should be a 'dynamic process'.
Financing the fiscal capacity
On the revenue side funding could either be generated through GNI or VAT contributions, similar to the EU
budget, or the fiscal capacity could generate its own revenue through taxes that are best enforced at
European level such as a harmonised European Corporate Tax, the Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) or some
form of environmental taxation. The FTT seems a particularly suitable source, as it can simultaneously
contribute to the containment of short-term financial speculation and raise substantial revenues.9 The
revenue contributions could be also made cyclical, such as through the use of output gaps, and would
therefore become part of the fiscal capacity's stabilisation mechanism. With dedicated resources backing
the fiscal capacity, borrowing from the centre should also be permitted, which would enhance the counter-
cyclical support capabilities of such an area-wide risk sharing mechanism. The borrowing capacity would
need to be backed by a budget of significant size in order to create an impact.
The fiscal capacity – an essential element of euro zone stability
With a fiscal capacity the number and impact of future crises could be reduced, as higher fiscal risk sharing
will not only decrease the occurrence of crises, but could also prevent cross-border spillovers (IMF 2013,
p. 23). This new structure could indeed be a strong element to correct some of the flaws of the currency
union. However, the creation of such a new institutional framework might require lengthy political
negotiations and an overhaul of the current legal framework, including potential treaty changes in the
future. In addition, the fiscal capacity, if poorly constructed, could favour moral hazard and will 
therefore require a strong form of central oversight (IMF 2013, p. 23). Furthermore, conflict could arise
about the demarcation of the euro area from the EU in its entirety: How would the fiscal capacity be
managed in the current institutional framework? How could the fiscal capacity exist next to the Multiannual
Financial Framework (MFF)? Could the fiscal capacity also apply to non-euro area members and if yes,
under which conditions?
A fiscal capacity would be an essential element of future euro zone stability but it "should follow some basic
principles: it should not act as a brake on further integration; it should be substantial and effectively
demonstrate solidarity with the crisis countries and their citizens without excessive conditionalities; it
should be focused with a clear purpose; and it needs to be inclusive in order not to cement a separation of
the euro zone from the rest." (Zuleeg & Emmanouilidis 2012, p. 2). Nevertheless, signalling commitment
and setting off along this path, by introducing a mechanism which can be developed further in future in a
dynamic, ongoing process, would create further confidence for the future of the euro area. Euro area
governments and EU institutions (including the EP) should thus intensify their efforts to set out the
conditions, roadmap and outline features of a fiscal capacity in the very near future. As mentioned
previously, the construction of a fiscal capacity should constitute a key priority in the new political cycle.
In addition to a fiscal capacity, the euro area is also in need of growth and job inducing measures in the
short term. Thus, a fiscal stimulus should be provided now through a temporary one-off provision. In a
similar vein as the transition of the EFSF into the ESM, this temporary fiscal support could be
institutionalised into the fiscal capacity at a later stage.
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A growth and investment programme
Growth and structural reform
Although it seems that the recession has bottomed-out and that GDP growth in the euro area is slowly
picking up, a positive longer-term outlook is far from certain due to low labour productivity growth in the
region (OECD 2014a) and continuing difficulties in some countries to achieve a sustainable growth path.
So far structural reform and internal devaluation have been the predominant parts of the policy mix aimed at
creating higher growth for the entire euro area. Due to the fact that economic crises significantly accelerate
reform efforts and resistance to fundamental reforms are weaker, a lot has been achieved, especially in the
Programme Countries, in the fields of product and labour market policies, education, pensions, fiscal
consolidation, tax reform and less so in infrastructure since the onset of the crisis (OECD 2014b).
In recent years, since the crisis hit, the formerly large negative current account in deficit countries,
especially in Southern Europe, has been reduced and in some countries even turned into a surplus. While
these current account improvements can largely be ascribed to the collapse of internal demand, a
significant part of this adjustment also seems to be permanent and irreversible due to structural adjustments
carried out in deficit countries. Price competitiveness in these countries was improved through the large
reductions of unit labour costs. However, reform progress was more limited in product markets which
prevented, among other things, prices to adjust in the same manner as wages. (OECD 2014a, p. 15)
Whereas the focus of structural reforms in the entirety of the euro area should be placed on further product
market reform, some countries, such as Greece and Spain, are still in need of continuing labour market
improvements. Once the recovery will gain momentum, without labour market reform, high unemployment
may not decrease to pre-crisis levels and would therefore become structurally embedded in these countries'
labour markets given the severity and long duration of the recession. The key priority in this field should
therefore be to counteract such a potential transmission of high cyclical into structural unemployment (OECD
2014a, p. 24). As the largest part of the necessary fiscal consolidation in the euro area has already been carried
out, remaining reforms are likely to have a smaller negative impact on growth in the short term (OECD 2014a).
Despite these positive signs, competitiveness, growth and employment has not picked up as initially
expected in some of the countries that undertook the largest efforts, such as Greece.10 This is also reflected
in the unemployment situation: although seasonally adjusted unemployment in the euro area in July 2014
was at 11.5%, a reduction of 0.4 percentage points compared to the previous year, the most recent figures
for Greece (May 2014) and Spain are still at around 25%, with youth unemployment still recording above
50% in these two countries. While, in addition to encouraging national structural reforms, the EU has
introduced a Youth Guarantee – to invest in young people's transition into the labour market – and a
Compact for Growth and Jobs – to especially ease the availability of investment finance, these initiatives
have, however, not had the hoped impact on the ground, with question marks over the level of
commitment, including financing, behind them.
Going forward, the burden of continuous adjustment can thus not only fall on deficit countries, also
because these countries would benefit from higher external demand. Better product market regulation in
surplus countries could improve business environments and therefore give a boost to domestic private and
public investment which would in turn be beneficial for overall euro area growth (OECD 2014b). In fact the
service sectors in France and Germany have, according to the same study (p. 3), the highest barriers to
competition in the euro area, even higher than in Italy and Spain. Hence, a large potential for reforms in
core countries, deficit as well as surplus, is also a given. According to OECD (2013a) calculations,
productivity and GDP in the euro area could be raised by about 17% through comprehensive product
market reform by 2060.
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More also needs to be done to have a tangible and effective impact on growth prospects and to lead the
whole region on a sustainable, i.e. long-term, growth path. The EU has identified this problem and the
designated Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker has signalled his willingness to tackle it in the new
political cycle, with his announcement to free funds in the range of euro 300 billion for a European Jobs,
Growth and Investment Package.11
An investment programme12
Most of the structural factors underlying long-term growth can be shaped by governmental action, including
human capital, R&D investment, infrastructure, quality of regulation, taxation or the well-functioning of
financial markets (Barro & Sala-i-Martin 2004). While structural reform and improvements in economic
governance are necessary conditions for a long-term recovery, strengthening other important components
for long-term growth has so far been widely omitted from the policy mix. Investments in education, health
and infrastructure have been largely neglected. It is now imperative to tackle Europe's public and social
investment crisis. While the bulk of the investments' return will only be collected in the long run, the
additional demand for capital goods will also create higher growth and additional employment in the short
term, for example in necessary construction related to infrastructure investment. Surplus and deficit
countries will both benefit from these programmes.
There is a need to re-allocate more money from the EU budget to growth-enhancement measures. The mid-
term review of the MFF in 2016 could be used to redirect spending to areas such as energy security and
efficiency, the completion of the single digital market, additional and targeted support for structural reforms
in individual EU countries, or investments aimed at improving the links between regional and European
infrastructure projects. At Member State level, EU countries with relatively low public debt and deficit levels
should use the fiscal space available to lead the investment drive required for Europe's economy to recover.
Germany and others should increase domestic demand by, for example, increasing public investment in
areas such as education or the modernisation of their infrastructures. Finally, private investments and growth
could also be stimulated by intensified efforts to complete the single market, filling the gaps in areas such
as services, the digital economy, research and energy. Open and interconnected product and services
markets could have positive spill-over effects across sectors and drive economic growth.
Higher investment in education, health and infrastructure would have positive long-term growth effects in
most Member States in the current low investment environment. However, in times of scarce public resources
and tough decisions on allocation of public funds, supporting one economic sector equals another sector's
disadvantage. The same applies for distributing the funds among Member States. Even taking into account the
promise of designated Commission President Juncker, of an additional euro 300 billion in investment, a
strategic approach to targeting and prioritising the available funds to those sectors with the best prospect for
success is essential.
However, identifying and targeting the best-suited areas for intervention, in particular for public investment, is
not a straightforward exercise. According to Zachmann (2012), the success of economic sectors in receipt of
public investments is dependent on investing in all structural factors that were identified as being necessary for
sectoral growth. The author argues that, for example, in the case of high-tech industry, only investing in
broadband infrastructure but not in complementary education would not lead to success. This type of
investment strategy therefore requires investment in factors that have been largely neglected in the policy mix
up to now, such as basic education. It would also imply the reduction of public investment for sectors which
have lower growth prospects. The existing smart specialisation approach in the EU regional development field
could be a starting point to make strategic assessments to decide on priorities for public investments aimed at
boosting growth. As far as the identification of the appropriate sectors for investment is concerned, Hidalgo et
al. (2007 cited in Zachmann 2012, pp. 8-9) note that new specialisation efforts often occur in under-developed
sectors that are similar to those that already exist in a country. Hence, one way to target public investment and
reform could be to identify these types of connections between under-developed and already successful sectors.
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Furthermore, finding the right mix between public and private investment and ensuring complementarity is
also important, because large-scale public intervention can crowd out private capital. There should thus be
a focus in surplus countries on structural reforms, which are beneficial for creating private investment, as
well as on increasing public investment: "Measures to create more favourable conditions for investment in
these [surplus] countries would not only support medium-term growth but also help ensure that the ongoing
rebalancing persists once cyclical conditions improve." (OECD 2014b, p. 27)
Despite historically low ECB interest rates, the high cost of credit for countries like Greece and Portugal, shows
how low confidence and high uncertainty is preventing private investors from investing in the periphery and
that the available capital is not reaching those economies which are in need of it the most. Such systemic
uncertainty, including country-specific risks, will continue to prevent private investments unless action is taken
at EU level. For this reason, the European Policy Centre (EPC) has in the past called for the introduction of a
European Investment Guarantee Scheme (EIGS), which could provide an investment insurance for European
and non-European investors against political and excessive economic risk in these countries. The EIGS could
thus be a means to overcome the harmful impact of uncertainty on private investment through better risk
sharing between Member States. (Zuleeg 2013a). While the EIGS could drive a wedge between high
uncertainty and low investment and thus contribute to higher growth, reducing uncertainties alone will not be
sufficient to restore capital formation. Schneider and Giorno (2014) show that in countries such as Greece,
Portugal and Ireland, the climate of high uncertainty was only partly responsible for the overall investment
plunge recorded since the onset of the crisis. Reducing uncertainties would therefore be a supportive measure
to the pivotal direct provision of funding, in particular for the European periphery.
There is a particular need to provide access to funding for SMEs in the periphery. In this regard, the banking
union is a necessary but not sufficient condition for restoring lending, especially in crisis countries, where
households and non-financial corporations, especially SMEs, continue to suffer high barriers to accessing
finance; for example, average cost of credit for 2013 in France and Germany was around 2.3 and 2.1%
respectively, while in Greece around 5.9% and in Portugal 5.5% had to be paid (OECD 2014a, fig. 14).
Here, targeted but ambitious ECB policy and a significant extension in scale and scope of European
Investment Bank (EIB) activities are required. At EU level, investments could be stimulated by increasing the
EIB's capital base and expanding the Project Bond initiative implemented by the Commission and the EIB.
The EIB should also be equipped with essential funds so that a provision of low-interest public capital for
the correction of clear market failures is always available (Zuleeg 2013b).
Investment in infrastructure, innovation and human capital, continuing structural reforms, improving access to
finance and the reduction of uncertainty through faster implementation of reforms and innovative measures
such as the EIGS are all essential components in a policy mix to overcome the current crisis. But long-term
growth is difficult to obtain through structural reforms if at the same time funding is cut for structural growth-
supporting factors such as education or infrastructure, so the economic governance framework needs to take
account of public and social investment as detailed above. Thus, based on comprehensive ex ante assessments,
streamlining investment to only those structural factors that are indispensable inputs for the creation of growth
could also justify more flexibility with regards to the 3% deficit limit in the SGP. The European Commission
could make these types of assessments mandatory in the decision-making on country's fiscal policy.
The fiscal capacity and the actions for stimulating investment in the euro area are complementary measures
with the former directed towards the medium and long term and the latter towards the immediate short term.
The Commission should therefore ensure that the implementation of an EIP is compatible with the long term
goals of a fiscal capacity and that the possibility for a consolidation of the two measures in the future is given.
Jan David Schneider is an Economic Research Assistant, Fabian Zuleeg is Chief Executive, and Janis A.
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After years of economic crisis, resulting in significant changes to economic governance at EU level,
especially for the eurozone, the time has come to consider the longer term political and economic
implications of this new situation for the economic integration process. Not only to determine how well the
system is likely to function but also what more needs to be done to ensure long-term stability and to provide
the EU institutions with sufficient political legitimacy to carry out this new role. 
This article does not consider abolishing the euro, based on the conviction that introducing the euro created
a path dependency that makes trying to unpick the seams of the process extremely costly. While,
economically, the exit of one eurozone member state might conceivably be manageable (but costly,
especially for that country), the long term political costs might end up unravelling the whole European
integration process, with the potential for a bankrupt and politically unstable state outside the euro but still
within the EU. However, the status quo situation is still unstable, politically and economically, and needs
further policy reforms.
Governing reluctant member states
The crisis has shown that the EMU has created an even higher degree of interdependence, with imbalances
and lack of convergence – partially inflicted by countries themselves – threatening the stability of the EMU
as a whole and thus driving the need for (politically controversial) support for economically weaker member
states. The key policy levers to influence these imbalances are at member state level rather than being
controlled by the EU institutions. It follows that one of the key features of the post-crisis eurozone
governance framework is the need to directly influence the behaviour of member states, in particular in
terms of fiscal policy choices and structural reforms. 
To address this need, the new governance framework mostly relies on a legalistic, rules-based approach,
i.e. an EU legal framework with sanctions for non-compliance. In many ways, this represents a halfway
house between market forces and 'federalisation', i.e. pooling sovereignty at EU level in an executive that
can enforce common policy decisions. Not only is a rules-based system the EU's traditional response (its
backbone is legislative, after all), but both market-based and federalised solutions were seen as undesirable:
market-based solutions might lead to sovereign defaults and banking system troubles, while federalisation
was seen as an undesirable transfer of sovereignty that would be constitutionally tricky, as fiscal policy
touches on some of the most fundamental functions of the nation state, and would be politically impossible
to sell to northern European electorates, as it would have to include the mutualisation of public debt.
 
However, the new EMU governance framework is not purely rules-based: it also contains new provisions
that are more akin to the open method of coordination. In the new European Semester process, the main
driver behind member state compliance is 'peer group' pressure, i.e. being monitored by fellow heads of
state and government. However, in the past these methods have not worked successfully and this seems to
be the case once again for the implementation of the Country-specific Recommendations (CSRs). Studies
suggest that implementation of the CSRs is patchy at best. In essence, those member states that want to
implement the CSRs do so, while the rest can safely ignore them without the fear of sanctions.2 While the
European Semester process could be improved, for example, by putting a stronger focus on a smaller
number of key recommendations, this structural deficit of a lack of enforcement mechanisms will continue
to limit the effectiveness of CSR implementation.
In one area of the new governance, enforcement mechanisms had been ever present: the programmes
introduced by countries requiring public finance support, with implementation monitored by the troika of
European Commission, ECB and IMF. However, the troika mechanism has been highly controversial,
because of the loss of sovereignty it implies. Consequently, many have criticised the troika and the recent
developments in Greece can, in part, be interpreted as a backlash against the perceived lack of legitimacy
of the troika's actions, which is reinforced by the exclusion of the support and implementation systems in
programme countries from the community method.
The limitations of rules-based systems
For the foreseeable future, it therefore appears likely that the EU will rely on the tried-and-tested method of
rules-based governance. But the effectiveness of the system is still questionable, as rules-based systems
suffer from a number of limitations, including:
• questions about how to pick appropriate rules/targets, adapted to both the economic environment and
country-specific conditions; 
• the way that rules suffer from low anticipatory powers: they often address past crises rather than coming
ones. To deal with emerging risks, it is necessary to have significant instruments that can be employed
quickly (or even automatically) rather than having a set of inflexible rules;
• the perennial question of enforcement mechanisms, especially since, at EU level, enforcement is often
reliant on the willingness of the heads of member states to censor or even fine their peers; 
• whether a country's failure to meet a target is down to willingness or capacity to deliver and under what
circumstances there needs to be flexibility, and who decides on it; 
• and that the available instruments, both old and new, are too complex and therefore difficult to 
understand for policy-makers that need to quickly apply and comply with the rules. This complexity is
an additional factor that leads to low automaticity that obstructs the necessary degree of ex ante support
for the prevention of new economic and financial crises. 
The rules-based system is further complicated by the need to interpret rules which always opens up potential
disagreement. While the system offers the opportunity of taking the legal enforcement route, this requires the
political will to take countries to court, as well as patience, as rulings take time to be delivered. In addition,
there are questions over whether a court with legal rather than economic competence is well-placed to rule
on matters of economic governance. Furthermore, the reliability of monitoring information is critical to
ensure consistent implementation of the rules. If there is a degree of interpretation – in conditional rules, for
example, which are based on some form of relative concept rather than a simple, absolute target – it can be
difficult to reach agreement on how the data should be interpreted. 
Given the difficulties in changing the EU's strategic direction, it is also very challenging to change any of
the rules that have been written into the EU treaties. Furthermore, it is nearly impossible to take into account
country-specific conditions and circumstances, or changes in the broader macro-environment. This raises a
number of crucial questions: Is the same inflation target still appropriate in a situation where deflation is
threatening? Is it right to focus strongly on public debt? Is a deficit target of 3% the right one for all countries,
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given divergent growth performances and debt financing costs? Again, if, for any of these rules, there is a
need to consider more flexibility, who is empowered to make such a decision? 
For some countries, it seems that the main objection to any economic governance arrangement is more the
fact of attempting to impose rules at European level than disagreement with the content of the rules
themselves or how flexibly they are applied. In essence, under the guise of flexibility or reductions in
austerity, countries may aim for a repatriation of fiscal powers, which would undermine effective fiscal
coordination at eurozone level, as well as undermining the underlying political bargain: debt financing
support only with attached conditionality.
Another key challenge is to ensure compliance with the rules by both small and big countries to safeguard
the long-term credibility of the new governance system. Previous experience with the Stability and Growth
Pact shows that if large, powerful countries do not comply with the rules, the remaining countries will soon
follow suit. Recent debates already seem to show that some member states think the rules apply less to them
than to others, as illustrated by the debates about the flexibility of sticking to the 3% deficit limit (prompted
by large countries with public finance problems) and recent discussions on export surpluses, which
provoked highly negative reactions in Germany, despite being fully in line with the recently-created
governance instruments. Any exceptions to the rules, for example regarding flexibility, should only be
decided at the eurozone level and be equally applied to all member states.
But the lack of a priori flexibility in rules-based systems is a particular challenge in times of crisis and
uncertainty. It raises the question of who makes the decision on whether rules can be suspended or eased
in such instances. In the case of fiscal governance, any such decision (or the decision to enforce the rules)
by the Commission is likely to be challenged, especially by the bigger countries. However, if it is down to
the Council, it is difficult to see heads of state and government holding their peers strictly to account. 
In the current situation, the rules need to be adapted to encourage more private and public/social
investment. But this needs to be done while still maintaining the integrity of the governance framework as
a whole. The only way to do this consistently in a rules-based system is to amend the rules. In this case some
form of Golden Rule, excluding productive investment from the deficit criterion, would be a feasible, if
politically contentious, option. This would need to be accompanied by a framework to define what falls
under social/public investment for the purpose of such a Golden Rule. But, yet again, significant hurdles
need to be overcome, such as how to define what falls under the rule, determining who makes the final
decision on it, and ensuring its implementation relies on objective, independent evidence. 
But the difficulties with a rules-based, legalistic system go further than this. In the policy areas which the
EU now needs to cover which are close to the heart of national decision-making systems, the reliance on a
rules-based approach is unlikely to function well. While, at times, adhering to European rules in politically
sensitive areas can be politically useful in order to shift responsibility for unpopular measures, at other times
the political cost of compliance outweighs the consequences of breaking the rules, especially for the more
powerful countries.
A game-theory view of economic governance
The challenge of implementing rules in a dynamic and uncertain environment should not, thus, be seen as
a legal problem. It is, in reality, a political economy problem and here it can be useful to borrow some
concepts from game theory, political economy theory and transition economics to highlight some of the
fundamental political conflicts that limit the further development of eurozone governance.
Political feasibility: The crisis management strategy chosen by the EU to deal with the euro-crisis has not
taken political feasibility sufficiently into account, as is clearly demonstrated by the election victory of
Syriza in Greece. This should not have been unexpected. After all, in a situation with rapidly falling living
standards and few positive economic prospects, the messages of populists will gain traction. A crisis
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management strategy must thus build in the need to create constituencies for reform, as well as providing
populations with realistic prospects of future improvement.
Time inconsistency and moral hazard: Agreements based on the commitments of member states suffer from
moral hazard problems, i.e. the tendency of countries, once they have received the support they need, to
backtrack on the more difficult reforms and commitments they have previously made. This can be especially
difficult when governments change. As a result, any support becomes time inconsistent and the result is sub-
optimal, with no support and no reform.
Bounded rationality and asymmetric information: There are a number of information limitations which
arise in such complex governance frameworks. This is aggravated by information asymmetry, where national
governments hold more information than the institutions or the other member states, for example, on
whether reforms are implemented or whether there is only on-paper compliance.
These issues, in combination with the distrust between member states which arose from the euro-crisis,
imply that there is a prisoner's dilemma at the heart of EU policy: without support, there is no reform, but
without reform there will be no support. In the EU, traditionally, Germany has been able to overcome the
prisoner's dilemma by making the first move, with a focus on the longer-term national interest, but Germany
no longer takes this role, having become more 'normalised', i.e. looking out for more narrowly-perceived
national interests.
The final result is inertia. Member states try to muddle through without having a long-term agreed-upon
vision, necessitating ongoing ECB action to prop the system up. Given the continuing structural challenges
within the EMU, these periods of muddling through will be accentuated by an acute crisis for which short
term responses are found without addressing fundamental governance reform. In the long run, this may well
threaten the European integration process if a particularly acute crisis runs out of control or when the long-
term imbalances lead to a build-up of political frustration in the countries providing and the countries
receiving support. 
The role of the Commission
To overcome these issues, the literature suggests that a 3rd party could take the role of arbitrator, acting as an
honest broker. The member states (the principles) could delegate some common functions to an independent
body (the agent), which acts in the common interest. This could be (and arguably was in the past), a function
fulfilled by the Commission. But the member states no longer trust the Commission to act in the common
interest, in part because the Commission has become more politicised. There is a fundamental conflict
between the political function of the Commission, taking a role in the overall political direction of the EU,
and its role as an independent monitoring/assessment agency, regulator and arbitrator in the application of
EU law, for example in areas such as competition policy or in the assessment of member states' budgetary
policies. With an increasingly 'political Commission', potentially further reinforced by the link to the EP
elections made through the Lisbon treaty and the Spitzenkandidaten process, maintaining credibility as an
independent and objective arbitrator might be severely challenged in the future. 
One way to address this would be to outsource some of the functions that call for impartial arbitration or
objective advice and recommendations. Independent bodies could be set-up such as, for example, a separate
competition authority, as well as bodies to monitor fiscal policies, a statistics agency and a council of wise
men and women to provide advice on the economic strategy and position of the EU. Undoubtedly, this
would be a longer term process, but thinking about a fundamental reform of the Commission along these
lines should start now, including clear provisions to reinforce the political accountability of such bodies. 
But the fundamental issue is that, at member state level, many have had enough of 'more Europe' due to
the crisis and think that it is now time for 'less Europe'. In many countries, there are also signs of the 'British
disease', namely that any further integration is seen as undesirable and that further integration steps are
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blocked, with the argument that this might raise strong objections in the electorate. This will be a significant
challenge for the EU. There are already a number of areas where a process of 'inverse subsidiarity' 
can be observed. These are areas where member states want to retain control but EU solutions are now
needed as it is no longer possible to deal effectively with the issue at national level, such as energy security
or migration. In addition, further integration is also becoming necessary for the eurozone due to a process
of 'spill-in', i.e. further integration within a policy area with the aim of avoiding negative consequences,
here driven by the necessity to correct the flaws of the EMU (these contrast with positive reasons for
integration, such as a wish to move towards a federal Europe or the pull of positive spill-over effects).
Increasingly, we will see that what is politically possible diverges further and further from what is required
to effectively deal with the challenges the EU faces. Clearly, to have effective decision-making, there 
first needs to be agreement on what the EU should be doing. At the moment we are nowhere near 
such agreement.
More government than governance
Ultimately, there is a need for more executive powers at EU level, especially so as to be able to react swiftly
to any emerging crisis. In addition, an effective system also needs to have accountability mechanisms. In
national systems, this is usually performed by the legislative. But with co-legislators, the Council cannot
hold itself to account if it also has an executive role. There is also now a greater role for national
parliaments, which can create additional uncertainty: who, in the end, holds the executive to account? The
Council, the EP, the national parliaments, or a combination of these?
Currently, most member state governments are unwilling to relinquish control of executive powers in
politically highly sensitive areas to the Commission, insisting that the final decision-making power should
be retained at national level or, at the very least, in the Council. But there is no effective way in which two
bodies can share this kind of executive power. While co-legislation can work due to its sequential nature
and the absence of acute time pressure, co-executive power shared by Council and Commission is likely to
create uncertainty and delay that can be very costly in a crisis. The only way out is to vest powers in a
supranational body, whether it be the Commission or another construction. There is thus a need to construct
a grand political bargain based on the wishes of the population that provides an acceptable deal, including
institutional and treaty change. But further far-reaching steps seem highly unlikely at the moment, so at the
very least it will take time until the political environment is right. So, what can be done in the meantime,
in addition to preparing for such a bargain?
Improving output legitimacy3
One short-term measure may be to improve the effectiveness of the EU institutions, especially the
Commission, in delivering their policy priorities, thereby improving so-called output legitimacy. But the
Commission is not necessarily structured efficiently: a long-standing issue, aggravated by the recent
enlargements of the EU, is the number of commissioners. While the EU treaties have provided for a
reduction in the number of commissioners to enable the EU to cope with successive enlargements, it has
proven to be impossible to get the political agreement for countries to give up the principle of one
commissioner (at least) per country. Equally, having 'junior' and 'senior' commissioners, in line with similar
arrangements in many national governments, does not seem to be acceptable to many member states, with
some of the smaller states worried they would perpetually end up with junior posts. 
The number of commissioners increasingly leads to a strong 'silo' mentality, with each member of the
College virtually autonomous when it comes to their own portfolio's competences, and where inter-service
consultations and infrequent top-down direction from the Commission president is insufficient to break the
overall pattern. Eventually this leads to a lack of coherence and focus, and in the worst cases can give rise
to uncertainty about the overall direction and may even create outright contradictions. There is, however, a
way of potentially overcoming these difficulties. This would be through building on the existing structure:
creating clusters of commissioners around vice-presidents. 
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In previous publications4, we have suggested a possible distribution of priorities for vice-presidents and
clusters of commissioners to ensure that the structure of the Commission mirrors the overarching challenges
of the EU. The new structure of the Juncker Commission does partially reflect these suggestions, with seven
vice-presidents covering broad thematic areas without a specific portfolio. However, there is one crucial
difference: in an attempt to maintain flexibility (and possibly to assuage the member states' fears that this
would create 'junior' commissioners), the clusters of commissioners differ for each broad policy area, with
many commissioners contributing to more than one area. In other words, there is no clear cluster structure
but a matrix, as well as numerous overlaps between the vice-presidents themselves and between vice-
presidents and commissioners, both in terms of portfolio content and in terms of the supporting
bureaucracy. At the very least, this will require the clear definition of which commissioner is ultimately
responsible for what and who reports to whom at the outset of the Commission, but even so, the structure
might well prove ineffective without a clear hierarchy. This new way of working will also require effective
coordination between the president and the vice-presidents, guided by a common purpose and vision.
A more political Commission
If, in the end, this works, it will improve output legitimacy and, at the same time, will turn the Commission
into a more political instrument, with clear-cut political priorities and the ability to better deliver and
implement them, which raises fears over the politicisation of the Commission as discussed earlier on.
But politicisation should not be seen as a negative process. For a long time, many convinced Europeans
have lamented that the EU is remote from its citizens, that democracy is not functioning as it should at EU
level and that there is no engagement with EU policy debates. While current governance/political
developments certainly do not answer all the questions posed of EU democracy, at least it is a starting point
to get citizens more interested in EU policy decisions.
Even if it were desirable, it seems unlikely that we could go back to a 'golden age' where the Commission
does not get involved in politics. The Commission is already highly politicised and, increasingly, the EU
needs a Commission able to make executive decisions that can be implemented across the EU. This means
a move from governance to government, from a rules-based legalistic system to one driven by political
preferences, underpinned by mechanisms of legitimacy and direct accountability. 
But to do this, democracy at EU level also needs to be further developed to facilitate engagement. In
addition to the existing mechanisms of representative democracy, which are still struggling with low
engagement and participation, there is a need to develop a more accessible, informed participatory
democracy by utilising new technologies and building bespoke mechanisms for citizens to have input on
EU decision-making, such as developing an EU version of 'liquid democracy', where citizens can be
involved directly in EU policy. In addition, there needs to be a clear mechanism to hold the Commission to
account for its executive/political decisions, a role the EP could increasingly play. Improving democracy at
EU level will also require the finding of a solution to deal with the differences between member states,
especially the Euro ins and outs, with a need to find a way of re-invigorating differentiated integration.
While progress is certainly possible, in the end, decision-making and accountability at EU level will only
be as effective as member states allow it to be.
By and large, the EU could start to introduce some of the changes proposed here in the near future, without
major changes to the institutions or the EU treaties. However, the elephant in the room is the question of
what member states want the EU to do and how far they are willing to make the necessary changes,
especially if they require the further pooling of sovereignty in some areas.
Fabian Zuleeg is Chief Executive and Chief Economist at the European Policy Centre (EPC).
6
EPC Discussion Papers aim to promote debate about current issues.
The views expressed are the sole responsibility of the author.
Bibliography
Zuleeg, Fabian. 'Improving decision-making in the EU'. Challenge Europe, no. 22 (September 2014). Issue
on Challenges and new beginnings: Priorities for the EU's new leadership. EPC. (online)
Zuleeg, Fabian. A more effective structure for the Commission. EPC Commentary (7 March 2014) (online)
Zuleeg, Fabian. Beyond individuals: a more effective structure for the Commission. EPC Commentary
(9 September 2014) (online)
Zuleeg, Fabian. Redesigning European Monetary Union Governance in light of the Eurozone Crisis. CIDOB
publication (May 2015) (online)
1 This article is reproduced from the CIDOB publication 'Redesigning European Monetary Union Governance in light of the 
Eurozone Crisis', published in 2015. It builds on Zuleeg (September 2014).
2 Theoretically, the lack of implementation of CSRs might have some consequences, for example in terms of EU structural and
investment funds. But it is difficult to envisage this being implemented strictly.
3 The following sections draw on Zuleeg (7 March 2014).  
4 See Zuleeg (9 September 2014).
7
With the support of the Europe for Citizens
Programme of the European Union.
European Policy Centre
14-16 rue du Trône, 1000 Brussels, Belgium
Tel: +32 (0)2 231 03 40 - Fax: +32 (0)2 231 07 04
email: info@epc.eu - twitter: @epc_eu
www.epc.eu
DISCUSSION PAPER
Growth for Europe – Is the Juncker Plan the answer?
The King Baudouin Foundation is the strategic partner of the European Policy Centre
Jan David Schneider
20 March 2015
Executive Summary
The euro area is still suffering from low growth and high unemployment. For the recovery to become a
reality, there needs to be a balance between fiscal discipline, supply side improvements and actions aimed
at stimulating demand and growth. Increasing investment, both private and public, are important
components in overcoming the recession.
This becomes especially clear when comparing investment dynamics during the crisis with pre-crisis levels.
Total investment is still much lower than before the crisis and public investment is well below its pre-crisis
peak as well.
In late November 2014, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker submitted a long-awaited
proposal for a European Investment Plan that aims to stimulate private investment. Apart from the creation
of the new European Fund for Strategic Investment (EFSI), through which private investors will receive
public guarantees, the investment plan also aims to provide project assistance and improve the Single
Market by removing sector-specific or other financial barriers to investment.
While generally perceived as a first positive step towards increasing private investment, some commentators
have expressed reservations about the plan. These include, among others, the lack of fresh money for the
initial contributions to EFSI. Since a substantial amount of these contributions is reshuffled from other places
in the European budget, the question was raised whether EFSI can fund additional projects or just replicates
investment projects that would have happened without the plan. Other criticism relates to the high estimate
of the expected leverage ratio of 1:15, and to the risk that the plan will only have a limited impact on
stressed economies.
The Juncker Plan addresses private investment, but so far there really is no clear strategy to stimulate
productive public investment on the European and national level. Countries with fiscal space are reluctant
to engage in higher spending, while those willing and in need of it the most are restricted by the rules.
Member States and the Commission should therefore discuss options for further improving the euro area's
economic governance.
In addition to urging countries with fiscal space to increase investing in national public goods, investment
could be treated with budget flexibility. One could, for instance, upgrade the importance of public
 
Introduction
The current one-sided strategy of combining fiscal consolidation and structural reform to improve market
confidence and restore competitiveness, thereby leading Europe to economic recovery, has proven to be
insufficient. It is now clear that there needs to be a balance between fiscal discipline, supply side
improvements and actions aimed at stimulating demand and growth especially since the euro area is still
suffering from low growth and high unemployment, which is leading to political challenges. What the
European economy desperately needs are economic impulses that can increase growth and prosperity.
Monetary policy alone cannot drive the recovery. Aware of its limitations, European Central Bank (ECB)
President Mario Draghi, for instance, notes that1: 
Thus, structural reforms' focus should be on raising growth potential, not on fiscal consolidation. But further
action is needed. Some commentators have stressed that stimulating consumption could be a way to go,
given that the stronger recoveries in the US and also the UK were predominantly driven by strong domestic
household consumption. Raising wages in surplus countries, especially Germany, could indeed be a way
to increase euro area consumption. Legrain (2014), for instance, advocates to put a stop to the current
period of German wage restraints, with today's real wages being lower than in 1999 while productivity has
increased by 17.8%. Not only would raising wages in Germany increase consumption but it would also be
a contribution towards reducing euro area differences in competitiveness.
Part of a comprehensive growth strategy should also encompass further action to increase private and 
public investment. In late November 2014 European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker submitted
the new Commission's proposal for a European Investment Plan that aims to stimulate private investment.
The plan is a first step to close the large investment gap that the eurozone has built up since the crisis.
However, what is missing so far is a clear plan or strategy for stimulating productive public investment at a
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investment in the European Semester. Additional deficit granted for public investment purposes could be
attached to certain Country-Specific Recommendations. Another solution would be to allow some 
form of budget flexibility, such as the formulation of a new Golden Rule for productive public investment
becoming part of the Stability and Growth Pact's application. Besides relying on a larger amount of
flexibility in the rules, the Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) could be another solution to fund investment in
European public goods.
It will also be necessary to overcome the mistrust among Member States that is preventing further action. The
political bargain of stronger conditionality, such as through contractual arrangements, could improve the
situation. Increased trust will also be an important condition for tackling long-reaching economic governance
reforms such as the creation of a Fiscal Capacity, which could take the form of a macroeconomic shock
insurance. Such a Fiscal Capacity could make a real difference in providing the necessary funding to
maintain productive public investment, even in times of deep recessions.
The proposals presented do not attempt to be conclusive, but shall rather be an input for a wider debate on
how to increase growth and employment in Europe. The paper draws heavily on the discussion of a
Workshop on Growth and Investment, which the European Policy Centre (EPC) hosted on 10 December 2014
under Chatham-House Rule, with a group of economists and representatives from the European institutions.
Monetary Policy alone […] cannot overcome financial market fragmentation in the
euro area. Fragmentation across national borders also reflects underlying imbalances
and institutional deficiencies. Overcoming these require determined structural reforms
on the side of national governments to improve the business environment and setting
incentives to invest, with the aim to boost productivity, create new jobs and raise the
growth potential of the economy.
 
European and national level. Countries with fiscal space are reluctant to engage in higher spending, 
while those willing, and in need of it the most, are restricted by the economic governance rules. 
A modern European version of a New Deal could be the answer, with a focus on large-scale investment in 
public goods.2
The remainder of the paper will first provide some reasoning for increasing private and public investment.
Then a first preliminary assessment of the Juncker Plan will be made, followed by several proposals for
increasing growth through higher public investment. The Discussion Paper also takes into account recent
developments underway to implement the Juncker Plan as well as further highlights some of the
recommendations on increasing investment that the EPC has featured in the past.
The proposals presented do not attempt to be conclusive but shall rather be an input for a wider debate on
how to increase growth and employment in Europe. The paper draws heavily on the discussion of a
Workshop on Growth and Investment, which the European Policy Centre (EPC) hosted on 10 December
2014 under Chatham-House Rule, with a group of economists and representatives from the European
institutions. The opinions are therefore not necessarily those of the author of this Discussion Paper but rather
reflect the wider debate of the Workshop. 
The case for higher investment
Total investment in the euro area remains below its pre-crisis level; this applies to both private non-
residential and public investment. Claeys, Hüttl, et al. (2014), for instance, estimate the total investment gap
to be EUR 260 billion for the EU15 in 2014 by comparing the trend of total investment for the period 1970-
2014 with actual total investment in 2014. While public investment is close to its trend value, one can
observe a substantial decline when contrasting current public investment to its 2009 peak.
The investment slump during the crisis has been even more severe in stressed economies than in the core;
and financing conditions have deteriorated more for SMEs than for larger corporations (see e.g. Barkbu et
al. 2015). While the stronger than usual recession and the weak growth outlook for the euro area may
explain some of the decline in investment, Barkbu et al. (2015) show that other factors need to be
considered to fully explain the euro area's weak investment dynamics. According to their assessment these
factors are 'elevated financing costs and limited access to finance as a result of financial fragmentation, high
corporate leverage, and policy uncertainty' (p. 5). The Juncker Plan is therefore an important contribution
to overcome some of these factors on the way to higher growth. Once growth picks up investments are also
expected to recover further (Barkbu et al. 2015). Some Workshop participants, however, questioned
whether the Juncker Plan alone will be sufficient as such an initiator.
Many participants at the Workshop also stressed that boosting productive public investment either at
national level or by providing a more favourable framework at European level could also accelerate the
recovery. Public investment in innovation, infrastructure or basic R&D is much needed, as there are
necessary complements to private investment in these fields.3 In the energy sector, for example, public
investment in energy systems and infrastructure are necessary prerequisites to attract private capital. 
Rather than increased government spending reducing private sector investment – known as crowding out –
well-designed and targeted public investment can stimulate private investment.
Crowding out as an argument against productive public investment becomes even less credible with
monetary policy operating at the zero (nominal) lower bound, i.e. short-term nominal interest rates are at
or close to zero causing a liquidity trap. In Keynesian economics a liquidity trap is a situation where
ordinary monetary policy has no effect. In normal times, when interest rates are not at the zero lower bound,
fiscal policy raises interest rates, which cause private investment to fall. This form of crowding out does not
occur in a liquidity trap, where fiscal policy is not going to raise interest rates.
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Another argument for increasing public investment (or other public spending for that matter) is the
relationship between the size of fiscal multipliers and the business cycle. Fiscal multipliers measure how an
economy's income level is affected by government spending. If, for example, a fiscal multiplier is higher
than one, this means that, in total, national income increases by more than the additional spending. For
example, Gechert et al. (2015), show that fiscal multipliers are significantly higher during recessions than
in normal times or boom periods. This means that every euro of additional government spending leads to a
cycle of consumption and wealth creation that results in an overall higher national income. Taking stock of
this fact, Wren-Lewis (2015) argues that respecting a certain chronology for tackling large negative output
gaps4 and budget deficits would be much more effective towards restoring growth: Balancing budgets and
closing the output gap at the same time is harmful. Since at the lower zero bound fiscal policy is the only
effective tool to close the output gap, policy-makers should, generally speaking, deal with the output gap
first. Once the recovery gains momentum and growth is restored budget deficits can be reduced.
The EU Investment Plan – Stimulating private investment
Many consider the Juncker investment plan an important change in direction.5 Until recently there have
been no substantive efforts to address the eurozone's demand problems. The focus has rather been on
supply side reforms, i.e. structural reforms (although the term structural is actually too broad to define the
kind of reforms that have been and were supposed to be undertaken by some countries). Part of the missing
demand stems from sluggish investment but low consumption has also been a problem. Addressing the
public and private investment gap should therefore be seen as one component of fostering growth in the
eurozone, rather than the only policy response.
The Juncker Plan is one of the first crisis efforts that mainly builds on community resources/funding and it
may provide a momentum for other measures that will lead to Europe's recovery. The plan aims to stimulate
private investment through issuing public guarantees, providing project assistance and improving the Single
Market by removing sector specific and other financial barriers to investment. Its objective is to support
investment in strategic infrastructure, improve financing conditions for SMEs and middle capitalisation
companies, as well as fostering EU competitiveness. 
The plan has three pillars: (1) providing financial support through the newly created European Fund for
Strategic Investment (EFSI), (2) the creation of a project pipeline and provision of technical support to
investors and Member States, and (3) promoting structural reform and strengthening the Single Market. Most
attention in the public discourse has, however, been given to the first (two) strand(s).
EFSI will receive EU guarantees of EUR 16 billion, composed of EUR 3.3 billion from the Connecting Europe
Facility, EUR 2.7 billion from Horizon 2020 and EUR 2 billion from the EU's budget margins. An additional
EUR 8 billion are guaranteed from the EU budget without any pre-financing. Finally, the European
Investment Bank (EIB) contributes another EUR 5 billion euro. Hence, EFSI will have an initial input of 
EUR 21 billion.
These funds are then leveraged by an estimated factor 15, thus, in total, the plan aims to generate 
EUR 315 billion of investment over the next three years (2015-17). EFSI will therefore provide a public
guarantee of 1/15, or 6.7%. Out of the EUR 315 billion around three quarters (EUR 240 billion) will be
dedicated to long-term investment, with the remaining EUR 75 billion going towards SME and mid-cap
financing (European Commission 2014).
EFSI's governance structure will reflect the contributions made to the fund. A Steering Board will decide on
the overall orientation, the investment guidelines, the risk profile, strategic policies and asset allocations of
the fund. Votes are based on the size of contributions. Hence, for the moment only the European
Commission and the EIB have voting rights until the fund generates other contributions, for example from
Member States. An Investment Committee, which will consist of independent market experts and which is
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accountable to the Steering Board, will be in charge of the actual project selection. The Committee shall
ensure that projects will be viable and that the public support does not crowd out private investment.
(European Commission 2015a)
Furthermore, a European Investment Project Pipeline will provide investors with knowledge on existing 
and future projects. The EU Task Force on Investment, which identifies key projects and potential barriers 
to investment has already asked Member States to submit potential projects that are supposed to fulfil 
the following criteria (with priority given to the second criteria): (1) EU value added; (2) Economic 
viability and high socio-economic returns, (3) timely execution of projects (within the 2015-17 period). 
On 9 December 2014, the Task Force reported that Member States have already identified 2000 potential
projects worth EUR 1.3 trillion.
On 10 March, the European Council has given its approval to implement the Juncker Plan. With the
European Parliament's approval expected by June, EFSI is scheduled to be operational for project financing
by the end of this summer. The EIB estimates that the full system will be up and running by the end of 2015.
The plan is then supposed to operate for four years, with a review after three years.
All it seems?
The Juncker Plan has been criticised for its lack in providing substantial additional money. In light of the
EU's annual investment gap, EUR 21 billion seems indeed rather limited. The European Commission
emphasises that the aim is to offer financing solutions that crowd-in investors. EFSI will not provide grants
or subsidies but financial products that will be junior to those of private investors (European Commission
2015a), so the Plan can only be considered a success if it generates significant private investment. However,
some have expressed concerns that due to the reshuffling of funding from Horizon 2020, EFSI may even
provide a hindrance to long-term growth. The question needs to be raised why initial contributions to EFSI
had to be taken from exactly these kinds of budget positions.
In addition, whether the investment plan will be able to attract projects that would not have happened
without the Commission's new initiative, remains to be seen. The Juncker Plan really needs to be measured
against the return that the EUR 21 billion in initial contributions could have achieved in its former
frameworks such as Horizon 2020 or under normal EIB lending practice. It will be difficult to determine
whether EFSI will be able to largely fund additional investment or if a large amount of the selected projects
would have been funded by the private sector or even by national/EU money in any case. While the plan
is likely to deliver somewhat higher investment, the economic impact of the Juncker Proposal may be
limited if the projects miss additionality.
Furthermore, the European Commission has set itself a high benchmark. Horizon 2020, for instance,
provides funding to long-term, high-return projects. The Task Force will therefore need to choose rather
high-return, high-risk projects to make a real difference. The Investment Committee needs to be able to
identify these types of projects. It is therefore important that the Task Force will consist of EIB experts rather
than politicians.
A closer look at the project proposals that the European Commission collected from Member States further
leads to the conclusion that Member States have listed those types of projects that could not be financed on
national level. After receiving the project proposals, the European Commission emphasised that these project
lists 'do not pre-judge financing commitments by the Commission or the EIB' (European Commission 2015a).
This raises the question whether the project pipeline will consist of enough viable projects.
Other more technical criticism has been expressed towards the plan's targeted leverage ratio of 1:15. While
an overall multiplier of 18 has been achieved by the EIB in the past, the decomposition of the multiplier is
a novelty, which led some experts to evaluate the proposed leverage ratio as overly ambitious and
unrealistic to achieve in practice. Every initial euro contributed to the fund is expected to create two
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additional euros of subordinate debt. In turn, every euro of subordinated debt is then estimated to create
four additional euros in senior debt through private sector investment. Thus, a total multiplier of 15 is
estimated (composed as x3 x5). Although higher multipliers have been realised in the past, some Workshop
participants stressed that, when these levels of leverage where achieved, the composition was different (for
instance: x6 x3) and therefore the multiplier from subordinated debt to senior debt may be too high.
Geographical allocation and Member State contributions
The Juncker Plan does not specify any form of geographical allocation. The design of the mechanism could
therefore disproportionally benefit specific countries or regions. Even if a sufficient amount of viable
projects can be found, without any form of quota, more economically stable regions could receive the
majority of projects. Investors would for instance need to take into consideration the higher political
uncertainty in countries like Greece, which makes investment projects less attractive in comparison to core
economies. This could lead to a weaker than hoped for economic impact in theses countries that are most
in need of additional economic stimulus. Part of the plan is to provide technical assistance to help private
investors to identify worthy projects in crisis-ridden countries and to help governments to make their
proposals more attractive (European Commission 2015a). Previous examples of such Task Forces, such as
the Greek Task Force, are however no promising precedents.
The plan encourages Member States to chip in with national resources but provides rather limited 
incentives to do so. At the time of writing, several countries have announced to complement the plan with
additional funding through their national investment banks. Germany, France and Italy will each provide
EUR 8 billion and Spain pledged an additional EUR 1.5 billion. But are the funds channelled through the
promotional banks additional funds or were they already dedicated to projects that would have been
financed without EFSI?
Furthermore, the plan allows for Member State contributions to be neutralised with regards to their treatment
in the Stability and Growth Pact. The European Commission (2015b) phrased this rather vaguely:
Project selection and risk levels
The plan has been criticised for not promoting social investment projects such as in education, and for not
requiring any criteria of sustainability. For instance, EFSI could fund controversial projects such as the UK's
Hinkley Point nuclear project, whose proposal has been submitted by the UK government.
However, addressing the strained financial situation of SMEs by distributing roughly one quarter of the EFSI
funding to SMEs and mid-caps has been welcomed. But the plan does not provide a strong focus on
investments in sectors that can create significantly higher employment. Studies6 have shown that around
half of all newly created jobs are generated in young firms. While the majority of employment is still to be
found in older companies, young firms are the only group with a positive net effect on employment. Those
young firms that also exhibit a high growth potential (also known as gazelles) contribute to the creation of
new jobs even more. Thus, a further focus on gazelles and venture capital, in particular in the periphery,
could make the investment plan an active contributor to overcoming high unemployment levels.
While it may be in the Commission's interest to focus on 'shovel-ready' projects that will be quickly
implementable so that the plan can deliver results as quickly as possible, the first wave of finance should
not exclude those types of projects that need more time to be implemented but are already at an advanced
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In the case that the reference value of a 3% deficit is not respected, the Commission
will not launch an Excessive Deficit Procedure if it is due to the contribution, provided
the deviation is small and expected to be temporary. When assessing respect of the debt
criterion, contributions to EFSI will not be taken into account.
planning stage. Several commentators have even questioned the availability of a sufficient amount of
'shovel-ready' projects with the necessary risk level.
Another question in this regard is whether private investors would invest in projects that were selected by
the European Commission based on the required set of criteria, such as European value added and high
socio-economic return. Some Workshop participants suggested that these criteria may apply to the selection
of public investment, but are irrelevant for private investors. The Juncker Plan's project selection process
could also lead to competitive distortions, as the more projects of a private sector nature there are, the more
uncertain it becomes whether the Investment Committee is able to select the right projects (Claeys, Sapir,
et al. 2014).
As for the risks that the plan can cover, the initial EUR 21 billion will be subordinated to private investors
debt and will thus serve as a first loss tranche. The Juncker Plan therefore allows the EIB to finance projects
that it otherwise couldn't support without threatening its triple-A rating. For the moment, however, it is not
clear whether the guarantee will be large enough to absorb all types of losses. EFSI projects need to have
higher risk levels than the usual investments funded by the EIB and private investors. Claeys, Sapir, et al.
(2014) suggest that EFSI should finance very risky projects because it is likely that they will not be financed
in the current environment, also because the guarantee would have a larger positive effect for riskier
projects. Others have argued that EFSI will not be able to shoulder enough risk. Very high-risk projects
would need to be funded by the public sector instead.
Success or limited impact?
Strengthening the Single Market – the third pillar of the Juncker Plan – has so far received less attention than
the other two pillars. This is probably due to the fact that this agenda is not something fundamentally new.
In all fairness, the European Commission seems to be aware of some of the Juncker Plan's limitations. 'The
Investment Plan will not solve all our economic problems. It will not change the whole world. But if
implemented efficiently, it will change Europe in a very permanent and positive direction,' Vice-President
Katainen emphasised in January (Vincenti 2015). It remains to be seen if such a limited impact will apply
to the Single Market pillar. There is a risk that the actions undertaken under this third pillar become one of
the many endeavours of the last years to 'complete' the Single Market. 
Should this limited impact materialise, the immense amount of time and energy that this plan has already
and – once EFSI will be fully operational – will have absorbed, could eventually lead to loosing 
valuable time for overcoming the recession. Rather than providing momentum for further actions, the 
plan could lead to stagnation. In this regard, some commentators have argued that the creation of entirely
new institutions such as EFSI is not necessary. Holland (2014) for instance stresses that the EIB could 
instead, in cooperation with the European Investment Fund, finance a large amount of projects that already
have planning approval.
How to deliver stronger public investment?
One of the strongest criticisms expressed towards the plan has been the fact that it does not address the
shortage in public investment but only improves the conditions for private investment. In this regard, some
Workshop participants have stressed that an increase in public investment can only be part of national
spending and may be very difficult to be carried out at the European level, given the fewer European public
goods that could be invested in and the expected political resistance. Rather than granting some form of
flexibility for, at the moment rather unlikely, large national contributions to EFSI, public investment,
particularly including social investment such as in education, could be granted some form of budget
flexibility within the Stability and Growth Pact. Given the low interest rates and the fiscal space that some
Member States have, funding public goods through low-interest debt may be a more viable solution for
fostering a European recovery. 
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8The quickest and legislatively least complicated solution would be, for those Member States that have room
for manoeuvre, to agree on investing more strongly in national public goods such as education, health or
infrastructure. This would provide a boost to internal demand and could in turn help more fiscally restrained
countries in raising their internal demand without waiting for lengthy implementation processes, such as for
the establishment of EFSI. The degree to which these positive spill-overs would materialise may, however,
be debatable. Some Workshop participants argued that investing in public goods in one Member State will
not have a significant beneficial impact on other countries' growth. Therefore, European solutions for higher
public investment would also be needed.
However, despite lacklustre growth and the apparent investment gap in the euro area, including in countries
like Germany, there seems to be little prospect of this type of ad-hoc stimulus being generated. The strong
focus of Chancellor Merkel's government on keeping budgets in balance – celebrating the historic
achievement of the 'black zero' in the current recessionary circumstances – renders such a solution unlikely.
In this regard, it seems paradoxical that despite record low interest rates Member States will not, cannot or
are not granted to make use of cheap financing for public investment.
Flexibility and Golden Rule
Contrary to ad-hoc stimulus, there have been requests by many to adjust European economic governance
rules to allow for more flexibility (see e.g. Schneider et al. 2014). One way would be to upgrade the
importance of public investment in the European Semester. Additional deficit granted for investment could
be attached to certain Country-Specific Recommendations. This type of provision would also strengthen the
European Semester process, which has been criticised for having too little impact on Member States' policy.
Member States would then have an incentive to not reduce public investment spending in order to reach
the SGP's deficit goals. This practice has been very common among European governments during the crisis
despite various studies highlighting the detrimental effects on growth. Cournède et al. (2014) show that
attempting fiscal consolidation through compression of public investments is a rather bad idea. Within 
17 categories, the authors rank public investment among one of the worst choices for fiscal consolidation,
with only spending on health services in kind, social security contributions, childcare and family, and
education being even more inimical to economic growth. From a growth perspective, fiscal consolidation
would instead be better achieved by cutting spending on subsidies and pensions or increasing property
taxes. At an EPC Policy Dialogue on 24 February 2015 OECD Chief Economist Catherine L. Mann explained
why governments opt for cutting public investments despite these findings: since public investment
concerns no particularly strong interest group it is therefore an easy candidate for budget cuts. 
Another idea about budget flexibility is the formulation of a new Golden Rule for productive public
investment becoming part of the Stability and Growth Pact's application. Some Workshop participants
considered that such a Golden Rule would grant countries more leeway to counter the crisis. Regarding
specific proposals, Maystadt (2014) would define such a rule for countries that are subject to the deficit
reduction rule, i.e. Member States that exceed the 60% debt to GDP ratio. The former EIB President further
specifies three criteria that would need to be fulfilled to qualify for this form of flexibility: Firstly, eligible
projects should be in the European interest. This may be interpreted as a way to ensure that the cross-border
impact of investment projects is maximised and to create some form of area-wide stimulus. Secondly,
Maystadt (2014) would include a criterion for profitability, i.e. to fix a minimum amount of economic
return. However, if this economic return criterion also contains some requirement for including social
investment, such as in education and health, this would require some European framework for measuring
these social returns of public investment, something that the EPC has called for in the past (see e.g.
Schneider et al. 2014).7 Thirdly, in contrast to the Juncker Plan, a criterion of some form of sustainability
should be specified.
A sort of Golden Rule for investment could take other shapes as well. Some have argued that additional
investment between, for instance, 1/2% and 1% could be granted as additional deficit. While this ruling
 
9would allow Member States to dedicate more revenue towards public investment, a simple addition to the
deficit threshold without any further rules would effectively lead to an increase of the 3% deficit criterion. Then
Member States could just shift their expenditure without dedicating more funding to public investment. This
form of discussion would then lead to a very different discussion, namely the one on softening the Stability and
Growth Pact.
Some Workshop participants proposed to reduce the deficit criterion from say 3 to 2.4%, and allow for an
additional 0.6% for investment spending. Such a provision would prevent a simple increase of the deficit
criterion but would of course effectively decrease budget flexibility. The benefit in comparison to the current
rules would be that Member States gain an incentive to either maintain or redistribute their budget 
priorities to more growth inducing spending, similar to the proposal to integrate public investment into the
European Semester.
More flexibility in whatever form will, however, come at a price. Since the crisis, the underlying political
bargain of solidarity within the eurozone always entailed some form of conditionality to comply with structural
reforms and fiscal consolidation. As the Greek case shows, compliance with this trade-off has so far been
mixed. For this reason, some Workshop participants emphasised that the proposal for contractual arrangements
could be revived, i.e. some form of financial support in exchange for (investment-enhancing) structural reform.8
However, as we have argued in the past, for instance in Schneider et al. (2014), this form of enforcing
conditionality could be unpopular if it is seen as a way of exerting control from the centre. Furthermore the
process could easily become too bureaucratic with little real impact on economic growth, also because finding
the right scale of projects may be difficult.
From an entirely different perspective on flexibility, some experts argue that there are already higher deficits
granted. According to the recent European Commission (2015c) Winter Forecast, the French deficit for both
2015 and 2016 is expected to be 4.1% and so well above the 3% threshold. Some Workshop participants
argued that this shows the Fiscal Compact and the rule of balanced budgets is already handled more flexibly.
More fiscally resolute countries thus seem to show a silent tolerance to accept higher deficits in other countries.
As long as these countries do not receive any form of fiscal transfers from the community, such as through the
European Stability Mechanism (ESM), no real objection is raised. From this viewpoint, changes in the euro
area's economic governance structure are therefore less necessary. It is, however, questionable if this larger
fiscal space will also result in higher investment.
The euro area's fundamental political economy problem and how this is preventing
higher investment
Whatever form flexibility would take, pursuing one of the above proposals would certainly be a change from
the current prevailing economic strategy. The German government has been severely criticised by many across
Europe for its strong position on fiscal consolidation, thereby neglecting the euro area's demand problem,
including the (public) investment gap. Despite the perceived large discrepancy between austerity proponents
and those demanding more economic stimulus, these positions might be balanced out if there was not a large
trust issue among EU Member States. Countries like Germany, the Netherlands or Finland do not have enough
faith in Italy's, France's or the periphery's ability to reform. In the latter group, there is even mistrust amongst
each other. This fundamental political economy problem has so far been a strong impediment towards
achieving a proper recovery.
So far the German governments, i.e. the last three Merkel cabinets, have only done what was absolutely
necessary and unavoidable to save the euro – the bare minimum to prevent immediate disintegration.
Chancellor Merkel's strategy of 'muddling through' can either be regarded as visionless or just as a reflection
of a fundamental German dilemma: without sufficient trust in the capability and willingness of other euro
countries to engage in reforms and to create better conditions for potential growth, there is no basis for granting
more fiscal stimulus by, for instance, agreeing to create higher flexibility in the rules, which could lead to
higher levels of public investment.
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There is no perfect recipe but some form of conditionality could be a solution. But the most powerful
impulse would probably be a better-coordinated approach between France and Italy to credibly signal their
commitment to economic reform. This could stimulate the more fiscally resolute countries to be more
lenient with regards to respecting the Stability and Growth Pact, or even in providing further support, 
for example through a Fiscal Capacity. Even though opinions may differ substantively on the necessity 
of structural reform – after all, Germany's track record of labour market rigidities and red tape in 
service markets is high – this is what Germany would need in order to feel comfortable in providing 
more fiscal stimulus.
The Financial Transaction Tax (FTT)9
Other than relying on a larger amount of flexibility in the rules, the Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) could
be a way to generate substantial revenues that could be used for increasing public investment. After the
breakdown of negotiations in December 2014, the prospect for realising an FTT were improved in January
2015 when negotiations between the eleven participating Member States were revived and the launch date
(1 January 2016) finally decided.
However, many questions remain. The European Commission initially proposed to levy a tax of 0.1% on
the exchange of bonds and shares. Derivative transactions were supposed to be taxed at 0.01%. Especially
the proposition to tax derivatives was subject to intense debate between several participating countries.
While being generally in favour of a European FTT, the French government has been reluctant to accept the
taxation of all types of derivatives in order to protect the interest of large French banks. It is still unclear what
the final taxable base of the FTT will be. Furthermore, there is still no clear agreement on the level of tax
rates and the final use of the revenues.
Regarding the usage of revenues Majocchi (2014) suggests that rather than distributing FTT revenues to the
participating Member States, these could go towards a European Fund for Growth and Employment. This
could be a way to provide substantial funding for investment in European public goods.
A Fiscal Capacity
The proposals presented so far will not be sufficient to create a genuine Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU). The current system of fiscal policy coordination, which was set out under the Maastricht Treaty, is
not adequate to deal with large regional economic shocks. The Fiscal Capacity, as outlined in the 
Four-President-Report 'Towards a genuine economic and monetary union', which was led by former
European Council President Herman Van Rompuy (2012), could be a way to improve EMU in the medium
term. From the debate on the Fiscal Capacity several variations emerged; some of them could make 
a real difference in providing necessary funding to maintain productive public investment, even in times of
deep recessions.10
One part of the debate concerns the creation of a European unemployment insurance that could for
instance ensure a minimum amount of protection in case of severe economic shocks. If such insurance
would have been in place before the onset of the euro area crisis it could have cushioned the severe social
implications that emerged from high unemployment in Europe's stressed economies. Establishing such a
form of fiscal risk sharing in the EU is, however, rather difficult due the to large differences in national
labour markets; so there would need to be some form of harmonisation. Furthermore, the macroeconomic
scale that such insurance could achieve would be limited and the effect on mitigating regional shocks may
be rather weak.11 Moreover, for the purpose of maintaining public investment in times of crisis, other types
of Fiscal Capacities are necessary.
Probably the best way to remedy insufficient fiscal responses in the face of regional fiscal shocks as
observed in the European periphery would be to set up some type of macroeconomic insurance
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mechanism. This could help to maintain productive public investment and other essential spending in deep
recessions. Such a scheme could rely on a measure of the business cycle, such as output gaps. Through this
measure participating Member States' payments to and contributions from the insurance mechanism could
be determined.
While this could be an elegant solution to account for insufficient fiscal responses in times of crisis,
operating such a mechanism in practice could be very difficult. The calculation of the output gap is subject
to many uncertainties and estimates vary substantively dependant on the chosen estimation methodology,
of which there are many. Furthermore, historical revision of national account data, which provide inputs for
calculating output gaps, can significantly change estimates retrospectively. These uncertainties would then
make calculating contributions to such a scheme difficult, especially in real-time and even more so for
forecasting them. 
One important characteristic for such a mechanism – especially important for its political feasibility – would
be the adherence to address cyclical variations only. The insurance scheme should thus not result in
unidirectional or permanent transfers between Member States. In practice this would mean that transfers
exchanged via the mechanism would balance over the medium term. If we take Germany as an example,
the scheme would have resulted in transfers to the German federal budget in the recession years in the early
2000s and to positive support payments during the heights of the sovereign debt crisis. Enderlein et al.
(2013) show that Germany's net transfers to such a scheme could well have been close to zero during the
period 1999-2014.
This type of Fiscal Capacity could therefore be an attractive contribution to improving EMU in the 
medium term. Such a stability fund would be particularly helpful to provide countries with limited fiscal
space to engage in fiscal policy and to also maintain an adequate level of productive public investment. 
For it to become a reality it would be helpful if output gap estimates could be made more reliable as a 
policy indicator.
Conclusion
This paper provided an input to the current discussion on how to increase private and public investment in
the euro area. Increasing investment is an important component in overcoming low growth and high
unemployment in Europe as total investment is still lower than before the crisis and also public investment
is well below its pre-crisis peak. 
The Juncker Plan is therefore a first positive step towards spurring private investment. The success of the plan
will be dependent on whether the Commission can address the reservations that were expressed towards it.
These include, among others, the lack in providing substantial additional money, achieving the high
leverage ratio of 1:15 or the risk that the plan will only have a limited impact in stressed economies.
Member States and the Commission should also discuss options for increasing productive public
investment. In addition to urging countries with fiscal space to increase investment in national public goods,
these could entail a form of budget flexibility in the Stability and Growth Pact, including some form of a
new Golden Rule or an upgrade of the importance of public investment in the European Semester.
But the current focus on investment also bears a risk. During the Workshop, one participant drew a parallel
between today's discussions around investment and those anticipating the Lisbon agenda devised in 2000.
Back then, the buzzword used to be 'Innovation'. We know today that innovation wasn't the magic solution
to all of Europe's problems. We therefore need to be wary of 'Investment' becoming the new 'Innovation'.
Working further towards creating a Fiscal Capacity and on improving the euro area's current economic
governance framework are two goals that need to be pursued at the same time.
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In this regard, it will be necessary to overcome the mistrust between Member States, which is currently
preventing further action. The political bargain of stronger conditionality such as through contractual
arrangements could improve the situation. Increased trust will be an important condition for tackling further
economic governance reforms such as the Fiscal Capacity. 
Jan David Schneider is an Economic Research Assistant at the European Policy Centre (EPC).
EPC Discussion Papers aim to promote debate about current issues.
The views expressed are the sole responsibility of the author.
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Endnotes
1 Introductory remarks by ECB President Mario Draghi at the European Parliament's Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee on 
17 November 2014.
2 For EPC proposals on a New Deal for Europe see for instance Zuleeg & Emmanouilidis (2011) and Zuleeg (2014).
3 See Schneider et al. (2014) for a more detailed description of the complementarity of public and private investment.
4 Output gaps describe the difference between actual and potential output. Potential output indicates the highest level of output that can 
be sustained over the long run. In recessions output gaps are negative as the economy operates below its capacity.
5 The EPC has with its proposal for a European Investment Guarantee Scheme (EIGS) argued for a similar scheme: Using limited public 
funds, the EIGS could provide a form of public guarantee for private investment. For an overview see e.g. Zuleeg (2013).
6 For an introduction see e.g. Machado & Wilson (2014).
7 In this regard, the EPC is currently carrying out a project on the economic and societal returns on social investment, which is planned to
be launched in the second half of 2015.
8 The proposal was for instance set out in the European Commission's (2013) proposal for a Convergence and Competitiveness Instrument
(CCI).
9 For an overview of the European Commission's initial proposal for a European FTT see for instance Schneider (2014).
10 For a more detailed overview of the Fiscal Capacity see for instance Schneider et al. (2014).
11 For an assessment of a European unemployment insurance see for instance Wolff (2012).
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